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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction   
During the European Union accession negotiations, all post-communist Eastern European 
countries that became EU members established democratic institutions. Even though some new 
member states formed more strongly consolidated democratic institutions than others, all 
established institutions were sufficiently democratic to gain EU membership. Since acceding to 
the EU, some countries have continued to deepen their democracies, while others’ democracies 
have stagnated or backtracked.1 In countries that backslid, some politicians only harmed the 
quality of democracy in the short-term, while others spurred democratic backsliding lasting 
beyond just one electoral cycle. This literature review analyzes scholarly work on factors 
affecting democratic deepening to better understand why levels of democratic consolidation 
differ across East European countries that followed virtually the same institutional development 
process.  
 In the context of current Eastern European political trends, various factors could help 
clarify potential underlying correlates of democratic developments. The presence of some factors 
in countries that improved their democratic institutions and the absence of the same factors in 
less consolidated democracies could indicate what has most significantly impacted 
democratization in Eastern Europe. After examining the democratic consolidation literature, I 
will analyze these factors in the context of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. 
                                                
1 In this thesis, “democratic deepening” refers to countries that improve or consolidate their democracies. 
“Democratic stagnation” occurs when a country’s democratic institutions have not improved or worsened, but 
remain at an unconsolidated level. Finally, “democratic backtracking and backsliding” refer to countries with 
democratic institutions that have worsened. I measure shifts over time in the quality of democracy by using Freedom 
House Nations in Transit scores, which will be further explained later in the thesis. 
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Scholars divide the factors affecting democratic deepening into two broad categories. 
First, many emphasize the importance of a strong institutional framework. Institutions 
including—but not limited to—anti-corruption agencies, an independent judiciary, and 
responsive political parties provide important structural preconditions for successful 
democratization. Other authors contend that societal factors better predict democratic 
consolidation. Political culture—measured by public opinion, networks of civil society 
organizations, and shared historical experiences—may create societal preconditions that facilitate 
or obstruct democratic deepening.  Certain societal conditions may ease efforts to consolidate 
democratic institutions. After summarizing these key arguments, I draw attention to a growing 
field of scholarly work, which applies rational choice theories to democratic backtracking and 
emphasizes the effect of leaders’ preferences on democratic development. 
Institutional Engineering Explanations of Democratic Consolidation  
Several scholars examine the effects of institutional factors on democratization processes. 
Jacques Lenoble contends that institutions limit leaders’ actions.2  Likewise, Robert Putnam, 
Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti argue that institutions create “standard operating 
procedures” for political actors’ behavior.3 By limiting the methods available to politicians to 
exercise power, institutions can “constrain” leaders and offer them a framework that specifies 
their responsibilities.4 Establishing predictable ways for different actors to relate to one another 
may allow institutions to improve the quality and functioning of democracy.  
                                                
2 Lenoble, Jacques, and Marc Maesschlack. Democracy, Law and Governance. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. 
3 Putnam, Robert, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 7-8. 
4 Sadurski, Wojciech. “Conclusions: On the Relevance of Institutions and the Centrality of Constitutions in Post-
Communist Traditions.” In Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Zielonka, Vol. 1. 
Institutional Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 455. 
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Other scholars take a narrower rational choice-based approach to analyzing the effect of 
institutions on democratic processes. This literature review will emphasize the importance of the 
rule of law, an independent judiciary, constitutions, and political parties.  
Rule of law institutions affect democratization processes. Larry Diamond argues that the 
presence of strong anti-corruption institutions can secure a “level economic and political playing 
field.”5 Without strong, independent, functioning anti-corruption institutions, elites can stall 
democratization by monopolizing political power and centralizing economic wealth.6  For anti-
corruption institutions to properly function, states must allocate sufficient resources and power to 
investigate serious crimes. Diamond asserts that behind many democracies struggling to 
consolidate their institutions are certain political actors “starv[ing]” anti-corruption bodies of 
crucial resources.7 Weak anti-corruption institutions often either investigate only the ruling 
party’s opponents or fail to initiate any meaningful investigations. When the public cannot hold 
the political and economic elites accountable, democratic processes cannot function.  
Guillermo O’Donnell supports these arguments and describes the rule of law as an 
“essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests.”8 For O’Donnell, functioning rule 
of law institutions protect the rights and liberties of citizens and guard against leaders’ abuse of 
state power. When countries lack historical, constitutional traditions, Leonardo Morlino asserts, 
anti-corruption institutions act as particularly important constraints on leaders. Morlino notes that 
the presence of strong anti-corruption institutions in some Eastern European countries reduced 
the occurrence of anti-democratic action, especially when compared to states with weaker anti-
                                                
5 Diamond, Larry. “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State.” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 
(April 2008): 36–48. 
6 Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” 42. 
7 Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” 46. 
8 O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Why the Rule of Law Matters.” In Assessing the Quality of Democracy, edited by Larry 
Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
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corruption institutions.9 Philippe Schmitter furthers this argument by underscoring that anti-
corruption institutions provide a forum for the public to monitor and evaluate leaders’ 
performance.10  The presence of strong anti-corruption institutions acting as watchdogs might 
help explain country-level variation in democratic consolidation trends.  
Other scholars highlight the importance of the judiciary in checking the executive and 
legislative branches’ power. Larry Diamond argues that the presence of a neutral and 
independent judiciary is essential to democratic deepening.  The judiciary can mitigate attempts 
by the political elite to weaken democracy and to rebalance the existing power structure. The 
international community has recognized the importance of a strong, independent judiciary in 
securing democracy, as targeted international democratic assistance has improved the quality of 
many Eastern European judiciaries.11  
The constitution’s formal rules and power map structure can also impact decision-making 
processes years after the initial drafting.  Constitutions lay out the conditions under which 
politicians can govern and create a set of rules and norms that future leaders must follow. 
Furthermore, the crafting of the constitution provides citizens with a “symbolic opportunity” to 
express their hope for democratic institutions to take root and to become politically involved.12 
Perhaps this type of political action could encourage citizens to engage with democratic 
organizations in the future. Appreciating the limits of this argument, Elgie and Zielonka note that 
                                                
9 Morlino, Leonardo. “Constitutional Design and Problem of Implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe.” In 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Zielonka, Vol. 1. Institutional Engineering. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, 106. 
10 Schmitter, Philippe C. “The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability.” In Assessing the Quality of Democracy, 
edited by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
11 Diamond, Larry. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World. New 
York: Times Books, 2008, 126 and 165. 
12 Elgie, Robert, and Jan Zielonka. “Constitutions and Constitution-Building: A Comparative Perspective.” In 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Zielonka, Vol. 1. Institutional Engineering. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, 33 and 46. 
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constitutions are not the sole way to consolidate democracy, but merely act as an important 
initial step of the democratization process.13 Due to the vague nature of their argument and the 
recognized limitations, examining the process of constitution building might not prove as useful 
in the context of Eastern European democratization trends. However, examining provisions of 
the constitution and the checks and balances provided therein could reveal factors that affect the 
extent to which a democracy consolidates. 
The actual institutions and their legally delineated powers may matter less than how the 
people occupying the offices behave. Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin draw attention to the 
“ways that formal institutions interact with informal structures.”14 These scholars emphasize the 
power of political parties’ transmission role of conveying information from the people to the 
state and from the state to the people.15 By improving communication processes between key 
actors and those who they claim to represent, political parties help stabilize societies during 
democratic consolidation. This theory, however, faces significant limitations when applied to 
Eastern Europe. Because political parties have generally failed both to take root and to develop 
information transmission mechanisms in many countries, it is unlikely that this theory could help 
explain why some Eastern European countries have deepened their democracies.  
Grigore Pop-Eleches offers support for the idea that the transmission role of established 
political parties might not be particularly relevant to levels of democracy in Eastern Europe. For 
Pop-Eleches, these traditional parties have largely failed to establish ideological support and 
societal roots among citizens in the post-communist period. Pop-Eleches attributes the 
                                                
13 Elgie and Zielonka, “Constitutions and Constitution Building,” 26. 
14 Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Jason M. Lakin. The Democratic Century. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2004. 39.  
Emphasis not added. 
15 Lipset and Lakin, The Democratic Century, 64. 
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emergence and the popularity of centrist-populist parties in Eastern Europe to a dissatisfaction 
with mainstream parties.16 Voters disappointed with the traditional mainstream parties’ 
unresponsiveness to citizens, inability to produce economic growth, and governance scandals 
increasingly vote for emerging centrist-populist parties in order to condemn all other mainstream 
parties’ performance records.17 Ivan Krastev notes that citizens unhappy with the failure of 
liberalism “to deliver” on economic growth or on responsiveness to citizens’ needs provide 
opportunities for democratic backsliding.18 Dissatisfaction with traditional parties creates 
openings for illiberal leaders to gain power and to reverse democratic commitments.  
In the context of Eastern European institutional engineering, many scholars debate the 
impact of the EU accession process on regional democratization trends. Linka Toneva-
Metodieva highlights the central dilemma facing the EU in the post-communist expansion 
negotiations: a short pre-accession timeframe would not allow institutions to consolidate fully; 
however, a long accession process would decrease the EU’s leverage in implementation reform 
negotiations. She argues that the decision to allocate a short period of time for establishing and 
implementing democratic institutions inhibited the engagement of civil society organizations and 
citizens in the institutional engineering process.19 Bojan Bugaric also attributes the lack of 
consolidated institutions and citizens’ support for these institutions to a rapid process of 
institutional design.20 EU leverage can encourage democratic reforms—particularly on paper. 
However, for these institutions to develop strong roots, citizens must demand that their 
                                                
16 Pop-Eleches, Grigore. “Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism.” 
Cambridge University Press 62, no. 2 (April 2010): 221–60.  
17 Pop-Eleches, “Throwing out the Bums,” 251. 
18 Krastev, Ivan. “Liberalism’s Failure to Deliver.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (January 2016): 35–38. 
19 Toneva-Metodieva, Linka. “Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 15, 
no. 4 (July 7, 2014): 534–51.  
20 Bugarič, Bojan. “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: ‘Lands in-Between’ 
democracy and Authoritarianism.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 1 (May 20, 2015): 219–45. 
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politicians respect their democratic institutions.21 My thesis will move beyond examining the 
speed with which states adopted reforms and instead examine how well-resourced and supported 
these institutions were in both the pre and post-accession periods.   
Mihaela Racovita approaches democratic developments in Eastern Europe by focusing on 
the power delegated to various democratic institutions. She argues that national politicians often 
failed to implement democratic reforms and instead engaged in “window dressing” techniques—
masking institutional weakness by establishing façade structures.22 While theoretically 
strengthening key governance institutions, in reality, these façade institutions created a 
complicated, confusing system of overlapping administrative responsibilities.23 The inability of 
the EU to discern between real attempts at reform and fake institution-building inhibited 
democratic consolidation during the carefully planned initial institutional engineering process.  
States with a political elite that approached the EU accession process as a checklist 
instead of as a long process of institutional and societal reform may have democratic institutions 
more susceptible to democratic backtracking. The extent to which leaders consulted with 
stakeholders and established mechanisms through which citizens could hold institutions 
accountable, instead of merely creating a vast system of interconnected, overlapping 
bureaucracy, will likely affect democratic backsliding. My thesis seeks to build upon Racovita’s 
argument by applying quantitative measures to analyze the extent to which the strength of 
institutions before EU accession corresponds to subsequent levels of democratization. 
                                                
21 Noutcheva, Gergana, and Dimitar Bechev. “The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the 
EU.” East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 114–44. 
22 Racovita, Mihaela. “Europeanization and Effective Democracy in Romania and Bulgaria.” Romanian Journal of 
Political Science 11, no. 1 (2011): 28–49. 
23 Racovita, “Europeanization and Effective Democracy,” 29. 
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Other scholars assert that the EU accession process mostly succeeded in establishing 
democratic institutions. Milada Vachudova argues that, for many post-communist countries, the 
economic imperative of accessing the EU’s economic market enabled the EU to encourage these 
countries to democratize. Furthermore, Vachduova argues, any variation in levels of 
democratization after EU accession primarily depends on domestic factors—not on EU policy.24  
Studying individual states and their citizens’ experiences with democracy will shed light on the 
extent to which the EU accession process succeeded in establishing democratic institutions. It 
will also indicate which domestic actors failed to mobilize support for these democratic 
institutions following accession. By examining political culture and using a case study approach, 
I hope to address the concerns that Vachudova raises in her work. 
Political Cultural Explanations of Democratic Consolidation  
 Some scholars discount the effect of institutional engineering on democratization 
processes. Instead, they find that certain societal conditions facilitate democratic consolidation. 
Of these society-based arguments, five main factors emerge: (1) the impact of civil society 
organizations on public trust; (2) the extent to which the public approves of the democratic 
system; (3) historical experiences; (4) levels of education; and, (5) economic developments. This 
section seeks to analyze the extent to which these different factors can help explain democratic 
deepening processes in Eastern Europe.  
Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti contend that trust improves 
prospects for democratic consolidation. They assert that social networks “foster mutual trust.”25 
Higher levels of societal trust, they argue, decrease the likelihood that political leaders will 
                                                
24 Vachudova, Milada Anna. “External Actors and Regime Change: How Post-Communism Transformed 
Comparative Politics.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 29, no. 2 (May 2015): 519–30. 
25 Putnam, Robert, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 89. 
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engage in opportunistic and self-interested behavior, which can harm the democratic system. As 
more people join these social networks, societal trust increases.26  In a study of twenty European 
countries, Nicolas Griesshaber and Benny Geys specify this argument by asserting that inclusive 
social networks minimize the probability of corruption.27 Both of these studies suggest that levels 
of trust may act as predictors for levels of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe.  
However, Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin argue that interpersonal trust does not 
significantly impact levels of support for democratic values or trust in democratic processes.28 
These different conceptions of the effect of trust on democratic consolidation are relevant to 
Eastern European democracies because regional public trust, trust in political institutions, and 
participation in political processes are all low. Trust in governance processes might not correlate 
to democratic developments in this region.  In subsequent chapters, I will examine the extent to 
which varying degrees and various types of trust affect democratic consolidation. 
Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock also examine the importance of trust and engagement in 
the political process in Eastern Europe. They assert that few young people participate in political 
parties and civic associations because many young people in the region think that their 
politicians engage in self-interested behavior, often at the expense of the public good.29 Roberts 
and Pollock’s argument indicates that participation in political activities might affect trust in 
political institutions. Countries with higher participation in political organizations may have 
higher levels of trust in and support for these democratic institutions, which could help explain 
                                                
26 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, 89. 
27 Griesshaber, Nicolas, and Benny Geys. “Civic Engagement and Corruption in 20 European Democracies.” 
European Societies 14, no. 1 (2012): 57–81. 
28 Lipset and Lakin, The Democratic Century, 119. 
29 Roberts and Pollock, “Politics and Trust,” 169. 
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democratic consolidation. However, overall low levels of political participation throughout the 
region probably decrease the importance of civic participation on democratic consolidation.  
Besir Ceka also examines low political participation, but attributes it to political party 
competition. He argues that the post-communist countries with the highest levels of political 
party competition have the most distrustful citizens. In countries with large degrees of political 
party competition, many citizens became distrustful of and disillusioned with politics.  As many 
citizens became increasingly cynical towards political parties and political institutions at large, 
they withdrew from public life.30 Low levels of trust might correspond to low levels of public 
engagement in the political process. If party competition—one fundamental pillar of 
democracy—creates disillusionment with democracy, then this could present a threat to 
democratic consolidation. It could create an opening for illiberal political elites to minimize party 
competition in a popular and appealing way. Examining trends in party competition and relating 
them to both trust in democratic institutions and levels of democratic consolidation might shed 
light on regional democratic trends.   
In contrast to Ceka, Natalia Letki and Geoffery Evans assert that trust might not be 
essential to the functioning of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe. These scholars contend 
that East European democracies with stronger institutions have “systematically lower social trust 
scores.”31 If states that perform better in institutional terms have low levels of trust, perhaps 
democratic institutions can function well without trust. Either way, levels of citizens’ trust in 
democratic institutions should be examined as a potential indicator of democratic consolidation 
or democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe.  
                                                
30 Ceka, “The Perils of Political Competition,” 1615. 
31 Letki, Natalia, and Geoffery Evans. “Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe.” 
Cambridge University Press 35, no. 3 (July 2005): 515–29. 
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Public trust and participation in democratic institutions might not directly affect the 
democratic consolidation process. However, higher levels of trust in the EU than in the national 
government could encourage leaders to behave democratically. Perhaps if domestic politicians 
observed that citizens in their country trusted the EU, they might worry that expressing 
opposition to EU policies could decrease their voting base in upcoming elections.  
For example, the EU uses the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) to 
monitor and assess political developments in Romania and Bulgaria. It describes the weaknesses 
of democratic institutions within these countries and works to incentivize reform. Since 2011, the 
EU has conditioned Romania and Bulgaria’s entry into the Schengen zone and their access to 
some EU funding on demonstrating progress on specific CVM indicators. According to Milada 
Vachudova and Aneta Spendzharova, Romanian and Bulgarian voters “highly value” both entry 
into Schengen and EU funding.32 When linked to relevant, salient domestic issues, EU pressure 
through the CVM has encouraged domestic elites to reform certain institutions. However, CVM 
only works when “strong domestic demand” for reform exists.33  
Trust in national governments and distrust in the EU might provide more leeway to 
politicians hoping to engage in self-interested behavior. If citizens trust the EU and provide 
electoral incentives for their politicians to abide by the EU’s values, then the EU might 
encourage domestic leaders to behave more democratically. Comparing domestic levels of trust 
in the EU with trust in national governments might help explain regional variations in democratic 
backsliding. My approach builds upon previous studies by analyzing the extent to which higher 
                                                
32 Vachudova, Milada Anna, and Aneta Spendzharova. “The EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: 
Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession.” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
European Policy Analysis, 2012, 1. 
33 Vachudova and Spendzharova, “The EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism,” 5. 
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levels of trust in the EU than trust in national governments encourages domestic leaders to 
behave democratically.  
Beyond incentivizing democratic behavior, Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina find that 
trust in the EU can cause a “spillover effect” of increasing trust in national government 
institutions.34  Positive views towards the EU can increase confidence in the functioning of 
national institutions by granting them a degree of legitimacy. When the EU describes institutions 
as democratic, citizens who trust the EU might be more likely accept that their domestic political 
institutions are democratic. In this way, Chiru and Gherghina argue, the EU might act as an 
“exogenous determinant” of perceptions of national institutions in post-communist countries.35 
Levels of trust in the EU could affect domestic views of national political institutions and might 
predict the success or failure of democratization. The extent to which levels of trust in the EU 
affect domestic views of national political institutions will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
 The presence of well-resourced and participatory civil society organizations also might 
improve democratic consolidation prospects. Vera Schattan, P Coelho, and Bettina von Lieres 
argue that certain types of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can instill civic values, teach 
political skills, and empower citizens to check abuses of official power at the local level.36 Larry 
Diamond concurs, noting that civil society can monitor governmental institutions by establishing 
a forum for citizens to engage in the political process and air their grievances.37 The presence of a 
robust civil society could improve prospects for future democratic deepening. 
                                                
34 Chiru, Mihail, and Sergiu Gherghina. “Does the Confidence in the EU Spill Over to the National Level? A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Political Trust in Central Europe.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 13, no. 2 
(June 2012): 226–45. 
35 Chiru and Gherghina, “Does the Confidence,” 239. 
36 Schattan, Vera, P Coelho, and Bettina von Lieres. Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Engagement and the Politics 
of Public Participation. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2010, 8. 
37 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 158. 
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 Public approval of democracy could also impact levels of democratic deepening. As 
democracies gain legitimacy from citizens, when few people support democratic institutions, 
they cannot last. Larry Diamond calls legitimacy democracy’s “lifeblood” and describes 
opportunistic, potentially anti-democratic leaders as “sharks.”38 When these anti-democratic 
leaders “smell legitimacy bleeding away, they sense vulnerability and attack.”39 Public approval 
both of democracy and of democratic values might impact democratic consolidation levels. 
Other scholars underscore the effect of historical experiences on democratization 
processes. Vera Schattan, P. Coelho, and Bettina von Lieres assert that in states with a history of 
“citizen mobilization,” citizens are more likely both to engage in the political process and to 
press for recognition of their rights.40 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel highlight that a 
“society’s heritage” impacts its worldview and may affect the structure of contemporary 
democratic institutions.41 As a result, Inglehart and Welzel assert, scholars should not ignore 
historical experiences when analyzing democratization. Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and 
Raffaella Nanetti also contend that distinct moments in history can affect institutional 
engineering processes.42 The unique types of foreign and communist rule in different Eastern 
European countries across time might affect the quality of their current democratic institutions. 
Another group of scholars highlight the ability of education levels to affect democratic 
consolidation. Lipset finds that in countries with higher levels of education, there is a decreased 
likelihood that lower classes will accept extremist ideologies.43 He contends that increasing 
                                                
38 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 89. 
39 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 89. 
40 Schattan et al., Mobilizing for Democracy, 1.  
41 Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know about 
Modernization.” Foreign Affairs, 2009, 33–41.  
42 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, 8. 
43 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.” In The Democracy Sourcebook, edited by 
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Ian Shapiro, and Robert Alan Dahl. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, 62. 
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access to education exposes the majority of citizens to a variety of ideologies, making them less 
susceptible to radical, anti-democratic views. Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin also claim that 
education and democratic attitudes are related.44 While most Eastern European countries that 
have acceded to the EU have similar educational attainment rates, differences in civic education 
might impact varying levels of democratic consolidation. 
Often closely tied to educational attainment, economic development also might influence 
democratic consolidation processes. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel argue that economic 
development often alters a society’s values—creating post-materialist values. When a generation 
assumes that its survival is guaranteed, the people in it switch from prioritizing economic and 
physical security to prioritizing factors such as freedom of expression, engagement in decision-
making, political activism, and tolerance.45 For Inglehart and Welzel, economic security and the 
rise of the middle class help establish a more trusting society through these post-materialist 
values.  Increasing wealth also encourages citizens to participate in politics.  This change in 
“worldview” increases demand for politicians who promote democratic consolidation.46  
Similarly, Lipset argues that higher levels of wealth decrease the likelihood that lower 
classes will accept extremist or class-based ideologies.47 Dahl also lends support to the idea that 
the society resulting from a “market-capitalist economy” and economic growth facilitates 
democratic consolidation.48 Eastern European states have experienced the economic transition 
from state socialism differently, so these economic factors might help explain divergences in 
democratic development across the region. 
                                                
44 Lipset and Lakin, The Democratic Century, 119. 
45 Inglehart and Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy,” 40. 
46 Inglehart and Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy, 38. 
47 Lipset, “Political Man,” 62. 
48 Dahl, Robert Alan. On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998, 159. 
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Beyond merely encouraging public support for democratic institutions, Larry Diamond 
contends that economic growth also enables organizations to influence the state. He finds that as 
wealth increases, people form groups such as trade unions and civic associations. As these 
groups grow in number, they gain influence over democratic processes and can monitor the 
government.49 Thus, economic growth can facilitate the emergence of new actors that engage in 
the political process to push their agendas. If high levels of political participation are favorable to 
democratic consolidation, then economic growth may improve democratization prospects.  
The literature provides reasonable explanations of distinct factors influencing the 
processes of democratic consolidation. However, their applicability to Eastern European political 
developments must be more closely examined. Since democratic backtracking in EU member-
states has emerged so recently, the field has yet to reach a consensus on why certain Eastern 
European democracies fare better than others. My research seeks to contribute to this literature 
by analyzing how well these factors explain the results of democratic consolidation efforts in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia since their respective EU accession dates. However, 
before moving into the case-study portion of the thesis, one last theory remains to be explained. 
This post-accession hooliganism theory forms the basis of the subsequent thesis. 
Rational Choice and Leaders’ Preferences  
 Some scholars have highlighted the importance of political leaders’ preferences. Gerard 
Alexander argues that “people are neither born nor made democrats, but rather select 
democracy.”50 For Alexander, elites decide to act democratically or undemocratically based on 
their expectations of support for the policies that they will pursue. Democratic regimes thus 
                                                
49 Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 99. 
50 Alexander, Gerard. The Sources of Democratic Consolidation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, 7. 
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succeed when political leaders expect their personal payoffs to be higher than their personal 
payoffs in other regime types.51 Wojciech Sadurski also argues that the political leaders use 
“strategic behavior” to make decisions that cost them the least politically.52  
              Perhaps the most seminal work that adapts rational-choice theories to the context of 
recent developments in some Eastern European EU member states is written by Venelin Ganev. 
Ganev argues that democratic stagnation and backtracking in Eastern Europe results from “post-
accession hooliganism.”53 For Ganev, post-accession hooliganism occurred as soon as Eastern 
European political elites were confident enough to “disregard the demands of their Western 
European counterparts.”54 He finds that patterned reckless political maneuvers threatening the 
quality of democracy emerged after EU accession, as at that moment the EU’s “sticks and carrots 
ceased to matter.”55 For Ganev, Eastern European political elites make rational decisions about 
whether they would benefit more from acting as democratic, rule-abiding EU politicians or from 
exploiting the political system for their own personal benefit. 
This theory could help explain why democratic reforms stalled after EU accession but not 
before. Ganev uses Romania and Bulgaria as case studies to show that while the countries 
negotiated EU membership, the politicians in both countries tried to improve their bureaucracies 
and to govern effectively. However, after they acceded to the EU in 2007, they failed to continue 
improving the organization of the state.  He describes a conscious behavioral shift in the same 
political elite who negotiated accession. Ganev argues that the “hooligan” politicians know what 
                                                
51 Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation, 5-8. 
52 Sadurski, Wojciech. “Conclusions: On the Relevance of Institutions and the Centrality of Constitutions in Post-
Communist Traditions.” In Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, edited by Jan Zielonka, Vol. 1. 
Institutional Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 456. 
53 Ganev, Venelin I. “Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007.” 
East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 27, no. 1 (February 2013): 26–44. 
54 Ganev, “Post-Accession Hooliganism,” 26. 
55 Ganev, “Post-Accession Hooliganism,” 26 and 32. 
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types of activities and behavior would make themselves popular both domestically and abroad. 
They can abide by the rules if they must; however, they frequently opt to flaunt the rules when it 
benefits them.  Ganev distinguishes these actions, which improve the quality of individual 
politicians’ lives, from attempts to remove the democratic system itself.56  
 Although my thesis draws heavily on Ganev’s theory, it distinguishes itself by moving 
away from analyzing politicians’ motives. Ganev often focuses on the intentions of political 
elites. He attempts to differentiate politicians who alter the democratic system for personal gain 
from politicians who attack the democratic system because they do not believe in democracy. 
Often, however, it is difficult to understand the true motives and goals of politicians. Leaders can 
strategically misrepresent their true views in speeches or policy decisions. It is unlikely that 
many politicians will follow Viktor Orban’s method of expressing their desire to establish an 
illiberal regime. It is potentially even more unlikely that politicians will admit to manipulating 
the state for their own benefit.  
Instead of emphasizing the motives of political elites, my thesis will analyze the 
institutional consequences of leaders’ decisions to engage in undemocratic behavior and will 
explore why these institutional consequences vary. The results of policies often impact levels of 
democratic consolidation more than the intentions behind political decisions. The implications 
for democratic deepening processes of how policies are implemented—or not implemented—
remains of central importance. In this analysis, I will draw upon the various factors discussed 
above that might contribute to democratic consolidation, or the lack thereof, in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia.57 
                                                
56 Ganev, “Post-Accession Hooliganism,” 39.  
57 Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia were chosen as cases in order to showcase a wide variety of historical 
experiences in Eastern European politics. While Romania and Bulgaria were subordinate to the Ottoman Empire for 
most of their modern histories, Hungary and Slovenia were ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These historical 
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This thesis also seeks to fill a larger gap in the literature. Often scholars focus on only 
one aspect of democratization in Eastern Europe, choosing to describe the effect of either 
institutional engineering, political culture, or leaders on democratic deepening. However, this 
thesis weaves together the three factors affecting democratization processes. By analyzing these 
three determinants of democratization together and separately, I hope to discern which factor 
appears the most important in predicting democratic deepening as well as to shed light on how 
these three factors operate in conjunction with or in opposition to each other. 
Hypotheses 
The literature suggests three separate and alternative hypotheses on the correlates of 
democratic backsliding, with each focusing on either the institutional engineering process, 
political culture, or the impact of self-interested elites on policy developments. While all of these 
factors could affect democratic backsliding processes in independent and unrelated ways, this 
thesis will suggest that combining these approaches offers a more complete picture of democratic 
developments in Eastern Europe.  
The rushed process of EU accession negotiations largely established unconsolidated, 
weak institutions. Reform-minded elites often excluded key stakeholders outside of the 
government—sometimes unintentionally and sometimes intentionally. The presence of weak 
institutions coupled with an unengaged populace created power vacuums in some states for self-
                                                
experiences resulted in varying levels of economic development, educational achievement, and societal norms and 
values. Furthermore, the degree to which communism penetrated these societies differed. Under Nicolae Ceausescu, 
Romanians arguably experienced the harshest and most repressive form of communism in the Eastern Bloc. By 
contrast, Slovenians—as citizens of Yugoslavia—had comparatively more freedoms than citizens in the other 
countries examined. Hungary and Bulgaria fell somewhere in between. Even during the democratic transition, these 
four states differed. Hungary and Slovenia quickly established democratic institutions and were invited to join the 
EU in 2004, but Bulgaria and Romania were slower to establish these institutions and could not join until 2007. By 
analyzing states with different historical experiences and arguably different levels of success in the democratic 
transition process, this thesis seeks to shed light on the applicability of my hypotheses on democratic consolidation 
in the region. 
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interested politicians to gain political power. From these new positions of power, illiberal 
politicians could undermine democratic institutions to varying degrees, along different 
dimensions of democracy, and with different lengths of impact. My thesis will initially examine 
the main hypotheses separately to assess how strongly these factors might impact democratic 
consolidation. It will then combine the explanations to analyze how some self-interested 
politicians took advantage of the weak institutions and the demobilized populace to mold their 
country’s democratic system to its present state. 
First, I posit that the states that created stronger rule of law and judicial institutions before 
EU accession were less likely to backslide on democratic indicators than states with weaker rule 
of law and judicial institutions. While the EU required that all post-communist countries seeking 
membership comply with predetermined democratic indicators and criteria, the actual strength of 
the established institutions greatly varied. Some states more completely implemented the 
democratic requirements—forming genuinely strong democratic institutions less susceptible to 
politicians’ whims. Other states avoided addressing structural weaknesses by choosing either to 
create bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities that masked institutional weakness or to 
intentionally underfund certain institutions. By examining variations in the strength of rule of 
law and judicial institutions before EU accession to the present strength of democracy overall, 
one can gain a better understanding of the relative importance of the pre-accession process to 
future democratic developments. 
Focusing on both rule of law institutions and the judiciary provides insight into the ability 
of political institutions to reduce corruption. These institutions—when effective—can also check 
the executive or legislature’s power. Both types of institutions safeguard a democracy against 
incursions by the executive or legislature, shielding democracy from illiberal attacks by the 
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political elite. Democracies with independent and resourced rule of law and judicial institutions 
are less likely to backtrack. I expect the strength—not just the presence—of rule of law and 
judicial institutions at the time of EU accession to affect current levels of democracy in Eastern 
Europe.  
Second, I hypothesize that political culture affects the extent to which democracies 
consolidate. When citizens trust civil society organizations (CSOs), democratic institutions are 
more likely to consolidate. Citizens are more likely to trust the information disseminated by 
well-resourced CSOs than poorly resourced CSOs.  Furthermore, when CSOs have access to 
resources, they can better monitor the performance of both politicians and institutions. CSOs 
with citizens’ support will be more likely to access politicians and key institutions—influencing 
them with monitoring evaluations. Additionally, high levels of civic engagement will likely 
deepen democracy, as involved citizens can holder their elected politicians accountable. The 
presence of strong, resourced CSOs that citizens largely trust can constrain politicians who 
attempt to undermine democratic reforms. 
Trust in political actors and democratic institutions also might affect levels of democratic 
consolidation. Since democratic legitimacy resides in public approval, when citizens do not 
broadly trust either the politicians occupying positions of power or the institutions themselves, 
the democracy will remain vulnerable to backsliding. In the case of East European democracies, 
the democratic legitimacy of external actors might affect the ease with which domestic political 
elites can manipulate democratic institutions. The EU monitors the democratic institutions of its 
member-states. While not always effective at reversing the democratic backtracking of certain 
member-states, it sometimes can either discourage or prevent these episodes. I posit that when 
citizens’ trust in the EU is higher than citizens’ trust in the national government, the politicians 
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in that country are less likely to engage in democratic backtracking. Since voters in these 
countries are more likely to vote for domestic politicians that demonstrate support for EU-wide 
values, the politicians in these countries will probably comply with EU democratic norms more 
readily than politicians in countries where the EU is less popular than national governments. To 
assess whether levels of civic participation impact democratic backtracking, I will examine the 
World Values Survey, which asks respondents about their participation in civic activities. To 
measure trust in both the national government and the EU, I will use the World Values Survey, 
which asks respondents about their levels of trust in the national government and the EU.  
My political culture chapter also examines citizens’ values. Democracy can be defined in 
a variety of ways to suit specific purposes. States whose citizens express more support for liberal 
democratic values, particularly those who prioritize the process of democratic decision-making 
over the policies’ outcomes, will likely have higher levels of democratic consolidation than states 
whose citizens do not define democracy in these terms. In order to operationalize this variable, I 
will use survey questions from the World Values Survey in 1995 and 2005.58 These surveys will 
allow me to examine any values shifts that occur throughout this period.  
Finally, I contend that the impact of certain political elites’ actions on democratic 
institutions since EU accession should noticeably impact the patterns of backsliding, stagnation, 
or deepening in Eastern European democracies. Implementation problems during the EU pre-
accession negotiations and short-term attempts to “rig” the political game both before and after 
EU accession will likely result in stagnated democracies. To evaluate the extent to which there 
are implementation problems or attempts to have the political system favor certain politicians, I 
                                                
58 The limitations of using data from the World Values Survey are examined in the political culture chapter. It is 
important to note that I chose these years because they are the two most recent iterations of the World Values 
Survey.  
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will use interviews with non-governmental organization leaders conducted in all of the case 
study countries.59 By contrast, sustained attacks on a variety of democratic pillars will likely 
cause democratic backtracking.60 Past in-field interviews will help define what constitutes a 
sustained attack on democratic institutions, along with reports issued by organizations such as 
Freedom House, Transparency International, and the World Bank. Finally, when politicians do 
not attack the democratic system and instead act as traditional, democratic leaders, democratic 
deepening will likely occur. The independent variables might be related to the dependent 
variable because Freedom House likely took into account leaders’ policies when creating their 
scores. By looking at the magnitude of change instead of the scores themselves, I hope to 
circumvent this issue. 
The relationship between these hypotheses is best characterized as complementary. The 
presence of weak rule of law and judicial institutions coupled with an illiberal political culture 
can provide opportunities for illiberal political elites to gain key positions of power and to 
implement policies that result in democratic backtracking. By contrast, in states with stronger 
rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a more democratic political culture, illiberal elites 
will have a harder time gaining political power and using this power to implement policies 
harmful to democracy. In both types of states, this thesis hypothesizes that the stronger the anti-
democratic leader, the weaker the democratic institutions, and the more illiberal the political 
culture are, the greater the magnitude of democratic backtracking.  
My thesis begins by exploring institutional explanations of democratic backtracking in 
Eastern Europe. 
                                                
59 See the Appendix (Table A4) for a description of the interviews with NGO leaders. 
60 Sustained attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on media freedom, CSO independence, rule of law 
institutions, and the judiciary. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL 
ENGINEERING AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING  
 
Institutional Engineering Hypotheses 
 When negotiating EU membership, all post-communist countries had to comply with 
predetermined democratic indicators and criteria. Aspiring EU members needed to establish 
democracies that met the Copenhagen political and administrative capacity requirements. These 
criteria mandated that all EU members form stable institutions that ensured democracy, the rule 
of law, and the protection of human and minorities’ rights. Under the Copenhagen criteria, 
aspiring EU members also had to develop institutions that possessed sufficient “administrative 
and institutional capacity to effectively implement” EU policies.61  
 Though the EU required that all acceding Eastern European countries adhere to these 
requirements, in reality, the actual strength of established institutions greatly varied. Some states 
better implemented the democratic requirements and established genuinely strong democratic 
institutions. Other states avoided addressing structural weaknesses either by creating overlapping 
bureaucracies that confused the institutions’ duties or by intentionally undercutting the resources 
allocated to certain democratic institutions. Regardless of which path a member state chose, in 
many cases, informal networks continue to frequently “undermine formal laws and 
institutions.”62  Different interests pressure various government institutions to behave in anti-
democratic ways to varying extents in Eastern Europe. This section seeks to clarify the extent to 
which the strength of democratic institutions before EU membership affects subsequent levels of 
democratic consolidation in select East European countries.  
                                                
61 European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. “Enlargement Accession Criteria.” European 
Commission, June 12, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-
criteria_en. 
62 Bugarič, Bojan. “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: ‘Lands in-Between 
Democracy and Authoritarianism.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 1 (May 20, 2015): 219–45. 
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 During the EU membership negotiations, the EU had an advantage that it lacked in the 
pre-accession period: the carrot of membership. By threatening to postpone a state’s accession 
until it met certain democratic indicators, the EU incentivized reform. However, some scholars, 
such as Linka Toneva-Metodieva, argue that this reward or sanctions approach failed to establish 
“genuine and sustainable reform.”63 When the EU could no longer threaten to postpone 
membership, the costs of non-compliance decreased. As a result, the EU has had difficulty 
imposing further conditionality that might strengthen the quality of new member states’ 
democratic institutions.64 Since the benefits of pursuing pro-democratic policies lessen while the 
potential gains from failing to improve the quality of democracy increase in the post-accession 
period, I hypothesize that countries that failed to establish strong democratic institutions before 
acceding to the EU will be less likely to deepen their democracies after accession. 
In order to examine the extent to which the development of distinct government 
institutions inhibits or facilitates democratic backsliding, I will analyze the strength of rule of 
law and judicial institutions in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. Focusing on both rule 
of law institutions and the judiciary provides insight into the extent to which the executive and 
legislature have checks on their power.65 Both rule of law and judicial institutions can safeguard 
                                                
63 Toneva-Metodieva, Linka. “Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 15, 
no. 4 (July 7, 2014): 534–51.535 
64 Vachudova, Milada Anna, and Aneta Spendzharova. “The EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: 
Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession.” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
March 2012, 1–20. 
65 This footnote clarifies how I define the strength of rule of law and judicial institutions in this thesis. In a state with 
rule of law, procedure dictates the ways in which politicians can pass laws. These laws must apply equally to all 
citizens. All citizens also must possess the same rights and freedoms. Additionally, in a state with rule of law, 
political leaders are not permitted to manipulate the legal system to achieve their own political or personal aims. By 
contrast, the strength of judicial institutions in a democracy requires judges to ensure that laws comply with the 
constitution, do not infringe on citizens’ rights, and are procedurally enacted in a legally permissible way. In a 
democracy, judicial institutions resolve disputes between political leaders and constrain leaders’ actions so that they 
cannot behave in anti-democratic ways without punishment. 
These definitions use concepts taken from the following texts: 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Why the Rule of Law Matters.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 32–46. 
  
 
25 
a democracy against incursions by the executive or legislature, protecting against illiberal attacks 
by the political elite on democratic institutions.  
 I hypothesize that democracies with independent and resourced rule of law and judicial 
institutions at the time of EU accession are less likely to backtrack after becoming EU member 
states. The strength—not just the presence—of rule of law and judicial institutions should affect 
the extent to which democracies backslide, stagnate, or consolidate after EU accession. I test this 
hypothesis by comparing these two institutions’ developments over time with interviews that I 
conducted with NGO leaders as well as quantitative indicators, academic work, and policy work.   
The Strength Rule of Law and Developments in Democracy  
Across Eastern Europe, many democracies have struggled to establish rule of law 
institutions. Both before and after EU accession, scholars have argued that these institutions 
largely remain “weak or underdeveloped” across the region. 66 The World Bank’s Rule of Law 
indicator helps establish a baseline of comparison between these countries.67  Country-level rule 
of law scores fall between -2.5 and 2.5. I have recoded the values provided by the World Bank so 
that -2.5 is the best possible rule of law score and 2.5 is the worst rule of law score (Graph 2.1).   
The graph below displays the rule of law scores across a 19-year period for all four case 
study countries (Graph 2.1). The green dotted line represents the two accession periods—with 
Hungary and Slovenia acceding in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria acceding in 2007. At each 
countries’ respective date of accession, a fairly substantial gulf in the strength of rule of law 
                                                
Larkins, Christopher M. "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis." The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 44, no. 4 (1996): 605-26. doi:10.2307/840623. 606. 
66 Bugarič, “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy,” 240 
67 The World Bank Rule of Law scores examine whether citizens trust and abide by the rules of society, especially 
regarding contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the likelihood of crime and violence. Using these 
public perceptions, it calculates a country-level score. 
DataBank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” World Bank, 2017. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators. 
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exists. When Slovenia acceded to the EU in 2004, it had a fairly high rule of law score of -0.92 
out of a total possible score of -2.5—as did Hungary with a score of -0.89. By contrast, in 2007, 
Romania scored poorly at just 0.10 out of 2.5, and Bulgaria followed suit with a score of 0.11.  
Graph 2.1: Country-Level Rule of Law Scores 
 
Source of Data: World Bank 
Overall, Slovenia has the strongest rule of law. While it worsened between 1998 and 
2005, it improved after 2005 and has remained fairly stable since 2009. By contrast, Hungary 
improved its rule of law until 2006, at which point it worsened substantially. The largest 
decrease in Hungary’s rule of law occurred after 2009, largely owing to laws passed during the 
Fidesz party’s legislative supermajority. While Slovenia and Hungary started with fairly strong 
rule of law institutions, Bulgaria and Romania began at significantly weaker levels. Though both 
have improved the quality of their institutions since 1996, Romania has seen fairly significant 
improvements in rule of law trends since 2002, while Bulgaria’s rule of law has somewhat 
stagnated over time. However, my hypothesis suggests that subsequent developments in rule of 
law would be less consequential than the strength of the rule of law at the time of EU accession 
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when predicting future levels of democratic consolidation. As a result, my hypothesis suggests 
that since Slovenia and Hungary had strong rule of law institutions at the time of EU accession, 
their democracies would consolidate, while Romania and Bulgaria’s weak rule of law institutions 
at their accession date would correspond to subsequent democratic stagnation. I find mixed 
support for these hypotheses based on the Freedom House Nations in Transit indicator. 
Compared to changes to their democratic institutions over time, as shown by the Freedom 
House Nations in Transit Democracy score graphed below, changes in time due to the strength of 
rule of law institutions seem to correlate with democratic stagnation in Bulgaria, democratic 
backtracking in Hungary, and democratic consolidation in Slovenia (see Graph 2.2). However, in 
Romania, its rule of law strengthens more than its democracy improves.68  
Graph 2.2: Country-Level Democracy Scores 
 
Source of Data: Freedom House 
                                                
68 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit scores measure seven key indicators of democracy: National Democratic 
Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Electoral Process, Independent Media, Civil Society, Judicial 
Framework and Independence, and Corruption. The lower the score, the more consolidated the democracy. While 
parts of the democracy score tap into aspects of rule of law, particularly corruption and the governance indicators, 
improvements or worsening in rule of law can occur without changes in levels of democracy—as seen in Romania. 
“About Nations in Transit.” Freedom House, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit. 
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The extent to which the strength of rule of law at the time of EU accession corresponds to 
subsequent levels of democracy seems mixed. Slovenia’s initially strong rule of law score 
correctly predicts democratic deepening. Similarly, Bulgaria and Romania’s weak rule of law 
institutions at the time of accession correspond with subsequent democratic stagnation. Despite 
having strong rule of law at its EU accession date, Hungary’s democracy later substantially 
backslid. This section further examines the extent to which rule of law institutions’ strength 
corresponds to democratic deepening in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia.  
Bulgaria 
 Bulgarian politicians have primarily failed to implement rule of law provisions since the 
early part of the democratic transition. Scholar Ivan Krastev dismissed the rule of law in Bulgaria 
as, “in many cases, only a fiction.” 69 One NGO leader whom I interviewed aptly summarized the 
difference between Bulgaria and some other Eastern European countries: 
All EU legislation had to be implemented into Bulgarian legislation until 2005, so there 
was a big movement of adopting everything in bulk. This backfired because we see now 
that EU laws were not properly transposed to Bulgarian legislative directives. Unlike in 
Poland or Hungary or Romania, there were no direct changes to the system that would 
allow politicians to overturn reforms or weaken democracy later. The reforms were not 
done to be productive, so we don’t see backtracking in Bulgaria. The reforms just didn’t 
turn out to be good at fostering democracy. 70 
 
At the time of EU accession, Bulgaria’s rule of law was weak because successive governments 
failed to implement provisions that would improve its democracy. Weaknesses in Bulgaria’s rule 
of law at the time of EU accession substantially account for democratic stagnation in the country. 
                                                
69 Another scholar, Mihaela Racovita, described Bulgaria’s approach to strengthening rule of law institutions as 
“window-dressing” tactics. One interviewed civil society activist called the rule of law reforms “quite fake.” 
Racovita, Mihaela. “Europeanization and Effective Democracy in Romania and Bulgaria.” Romanian Journal of 
Political Science 11, no. 1 (2011): 28–49. 
Confidential. Interview at 5:30 PM with a Bulgarian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, June 14, 
2016. 
Krastev, Ivan. “Liberalism’s Failure to Deliver.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (January 2016): 35–38. 
70 Confidential. Interview at 5:30 PM with a Bulgarian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, June 14, 
2016. 
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In 1997, the EU used the Copenhagen criteria to issue the first official assessment of 
democracy in Bulgaria. This report found the rule of law to be “unsatisfactory” and the more the 
EU learned about the rule of law in Bulgaria, “the more deficiencies it saw.” 71 Even as the EU 
lobbied Bulgaria to improve its anti-corruption efforts before acceding, the Bulgarian 
government neglected to prosecute high-level corruption. Bulgaria shifted anti-corruption efforts 
away from targeting important politicians to focusing on low-level corruption cases in the lead-
up to EU accession. Maria Spirova observed a focus on “satisfying EU demands rather than 
implementing real change.”72 One interviewed activist asserted that the pre-accession anti-
corruption reforms were “done to be completely ineffective.”73 The measures that Bulgaria has 
taken to improve anti-corruption efforts seem to have largely failed. The rule of law has suffered 
because of these weaknesses, as has the quality of democracy in Bulgaria. 
Some NGO practitioners have also claimed that the failure of the Bulgarian government 
to clarify which institutions performed which specific duties upon their creation undermines the 
rule of law. By refusing to provide institutions with clear job descriptions and goals, bureaucrats 
could not—and still cannot—function effectively, causing “chaos with the law.”74 Bulgaria’s 
drafted work strategies and agendas for handling corruption illustrate its failure to address 
corruption issues by creating uncertainty.75 Far from changing the distribution of resources to 
strengthen these institutions or from changing the institutions themselves, Bulgaria’s strategies 
                                                
71 Noutcheva, Gergana, and Dimitar Bechev. “The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the 
EU.” East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 114–44. 
72 Maria Spirova. “Bulgaria since 1989.” In Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989, edited by Sabrina 
P Ramet, 401–20. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
73 He explained that Bulgaria created “special criminal courts and appellate courts, which are complete nonsense” 
and that some parliamentary “committees are linked to the expropriation of property through illegal means.”  
Confidential. Interview at 5:30 PM with a Bulgarian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, June 14, 
2016. 
74 Sedlarska, Vesselina. The APIA in the Fight Against Corruption: Why the 14-days period confuses the 
administration of the Municipality of Sliven. Interview by Access to Information Program Bulgaria, August 2005. 
75 Racovita, “Europeanization and Effective Democracy in Romania and Bulgaria,” 40-41. 
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pretend to take initiative on combatting corruption, instead of taking meaningful action. In 2002 
and 2004, the government introduced the Action Plan for Implementation of the Strategy of 
Anti-Corruption. 76 However, it neither changed the way that people view corruption nor 
endowed agencies with resources to improve the rule of law. Even when the EU penalized 
Bulgaria for corrupting EU funds, anti-corruption reforms largely failed. 77 These work strategies 
and agendas have not meaningfully improved the rule of law or the quality of democracy.  
The failure to prosecute instances of high-level corruption has created discontent and 
uneasiness among Bulgarians—particularly amongst NGO leaders. During every interview that I 
conducted with Bulgarian civil society activists, I asked what pre-accession democratization 
reform failed the most. All mentioned judicial and anti-corruption reforms. One noted, “there are 
many corrupt politicians who do not go to jail in Bulgaria.”78 A different activist attributed the 
failure of anti-corruption reforms to politicians with suspect motives, arguing that the “problem 
here is that many politicians want to be politicians so they have access to state resources because 
their private business benefits from this.” 79 In an environment where politicians actively 
undermine rule of law institutions and have behaved this way since EU accession, it is not 
surprising that progress in this arena and in democratic consolidation overall remains poor. 
A lack of clarity in legislation—which has existed since the pre-accession era—further 
weakens the rule of law and contributes to democratic stagnation. One interviewed NGO leader 
asked, “How can we formalize the well-written legislation when they [the Bulgarian 
                                                
76 Racovita, “Europeanization and Effective Democracy,” 40-41. 
77 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 
2016.  
78 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 5, 
2016. 
79 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 
2016. 
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government] have no indicators of what it means?”80 Another activist described this unregulated 
environment as permitting “many formal institutions to interpret” laws and as relying upon 
“certain people to follow the regulation, or just to tick it off a checklist and say they are fulfilling 
it.” 81 In this uncertain environment with weak rule of law, it is hard to advocate for and 
implement measures that would deepen the quality of democracy.82 Bulgarian politicians have 
neglected to enforce laws promoting democracy, even before EU accession. In this environment, 
the laws might as well not exist, and democracy will stagnate. Bulgarian politicians’ behavior in 
the pre-accession period set the stage for their current treatment of democratic institutions.83  
Some aspects of the rule of law have improved in Bulgaria since EU accession. The 
government has recently extended the amount of time that people can comment on bills before 
parliament can vote on them. While citizens used to have 14 days to comment on new laws, the 
new normative act law gives them 30 days to send their opinions to the Bulgarian government. 
The legislation requires the government to respond to these comments. One interviewed activist 
discussed the implications of this law: “With things like the 70-page Anti-Corruption Strategy, 
14 days was not enough time to comment. Now, whoever wants to be involved may be, and you 
                                                
80 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 
2016. 
81 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 5, 
2016. 
82 Scholar Alina Mungiu-Pippidi concurs with this description of an “implementation gap” in Bulgaria between the 
actual legislation versus the way that politicians implement the legislation. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “The Transformative Power of Europe Revisited.” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1 (2014): 
20–32. 
83 According to an interviewed civil society activist, the media sector lacked procedural regulation and legislation 
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have time to inform your opinions.” 84 This law prevents parliament from adopting laws without 
public consultation. By working against the quick passage of laws without the consultation of the 
opposition or other key stakeholders, citizens’ access to decision-making has improved. In this 
way, Bulgaria has reinforced its commitment to the rule of law. 
Overall, however, the rule of law in Bulgaria remains weak, with little progress since the 
end of the 1990s. While some of these issues stem from active efforts to undermine legislation, 
the largest issue seems to be a failure to implement rule of law provisions. One interviewed 
activist highlighted that “the worst problem in Bulgaria is that legislation is not implemented 
effectively.” 85 In an environment where laws are not implemented, progress remains on paper 
only and does not improve the actual functioning of the rule of law. Weak rule of law at the time 
of and since EU accession—largely caused by the failure of implementation of the legislation 
already on the books—helps explain Bulgaria’s democratic stagnation. 
Hungary 
 By the time it joined the EU in 2004, Hungary had established fairly strong rule of law. 
However, the flexibility of the constitution left rule of law somewhat vulnerable.  At the time of 
EU accession, Hungary’s rule of law was strong largely because politicians obeyed rule of law 
norms. However, since Fidesz won a supermajority in 2010, it took advantage of openings in the 
constitution to “systematically” remove the checks and balances that undergird the rule of law.86 
By manipulating existing legislation in order to behave in anti-democratic—albeit technically 
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legal—ways, Hungary’s post-2010 government has campaigned to change laws for the ruling 
party’s benefit, undermining rule of law in the process.87 Though my hypothesis suggests that 
Hungary’s strong rule of law institutions prior to EU accession would correspond to democratic 
consolidation, its democracy has backtracked. This section examines the openings in the 
Hungarian constitution at the time of accession that Fidesz politicians later took advantage of in 
order to attack democracy to better understand the relationship between Hungary’s rule of law 
institutions at the time of accession and subsequent backsliding. 
 In 2004, Freedom House described Hungary’s rule of law as having a “sound 
framework.”88 Rule of law considerations largely guided politicians’ actions. When Prime 
Minister Peter Medgyessy resigned in 2004, politicians cooperated to ensure stability while 
forming a new coalition government. In 2005, Freedom House hailed this stable transition of 
power as an example of the consolidation of the rule of law in Hungary. This report also 
underscored that the “implementation of any new public policies will generally adhere to the rule 
of law.”89 Before 2010, rule of law in Hungary appeared to function, with politicians following 
legal procedure, ensuring the equal applicability of laws, and avoiding manipulating the legal 
system. Despite these positive trends in both rule of law and democratic consolidation before 
2010, it is important to remember what one NGO activist whom I interviewed highlighted: 
The problems in Hungary didn’t start in 2010; they just started to worsen. Hungary had a 
vulnerable, weak democracy and governments withheld information, appointed cronies, 
and awarded tenders to friends. What is new is that the institutional system has been 
systematically weakened and dismantled—and no state players can stop the government 
from continuing. Now, the administration doesn’t respect the rules and, for them, state 
institutions and the legislature are instruments in the executive’s hands to put the 
government into practice. 90 
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Though Hungary did establish fairly strong rule of law institutions and had begun to consolidate 
its democracy before accession, issues in the democratization process remained. Vulnerable to 
democratic backtracking, Hungary’s democracy remained strong as long as politicians 
subscribed to rule of law and democratic norms.  
Hungary’s 1989 constitution was quite flexible, allowing parties who gained a 
supermajority to amend it as they saw fit. The ease with which a supermajority could alter the 
constitution left “most of the political power” with ruling parties.91 Since those in power can 
fairly easily change the constitution, Istvan Szikinger argues, the degree to which politicians 
respect the rule of law largely depends on party politics. In 2004, at the time of Hungary’s 
accession to the EU, rule of law appeared strong because politicians subscribed to rule of law 
norms. However, Hungary’s institutional design permitted rule of law to remain strong only as 
long as politicians respected it, while providing these politicians with openings to undermine rule 
of law. As Szikinger notes, the Hungarian constitution could not “guarantee protection from 
majority tyranny” because of the ease with which politicians could amend it.92   
Since Fidesz rose to power in 2010, its politicians have undermined Hungary’s rule of 
law norms by using their supermajority to take advantage of the previous constitution.  Some 
experts, including scholar Gabor Toka, have described the ruling party as decreasing the 
constraints on decision-making—preferring legislative majority over legislative consensus.93 
Fidesz’s actions have caused Laszlo Solyom—former Hungarian chief justice of the Supreme 
                                                
91 Szikinger, “Hungary’s Pliable Constitution,” 406. 
92 Szikinger, “Hungary’s Pliable Constitution,” 407. 
93 When people attempt to hold leaders accountable by asking them to explain legislation to the public, the 
government “mock[s]” them.  
Toka, Gabor. “Constitutional Principles and Electoral Democracy in Hungary.” In Constitution Building in 
Consolidated Democracies: A New Beginning or Decay of a Political System?, edited by Ellen Bos and Kalman 
Pocza. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag, 2014. 
  
 
35 
Court and former president of Hungary—to bemoan that “the rule of law had ceased to exist.” 94 
Additionally, one interviewed NGO leader highlighted another shift that occurred when Fidesz 
gained a supermajority in 2010: 
Until 2010, a consensus existed to build democracy, promote rule of law, and keep 
different branches separate and independent with checks and balances. The process was 
vulnerable, but there was a consensus in the public edifice. This was broken in 2010 with 
the second Orbán government because they could redesign the public arena to their 
liking. It called many of the democratic institutions into question. Checks and balances 
were an idea of pre-accession and were achieved, but they stopped working [in 2010]. 95 
 
Fidesz cunningly manipulates legislative rules and passes legislation in improper ways that 
contravene precedent in order to decrease the number of checks and balances in the Hungarian 
political system, which harms the quality of Hungary’s rule of law. This suggests that my 
hypothesis may be incomplete. Perhaps other elements of institutional design, such as the ease of 
changing legislative rules, the electoral system, and the constitution, matter more than the 
strength of rule of law in predicting democratic developments.  
Fidesz took advantage of the opening in Hungary’s 1989 constitution that effectively 
allowed supermajorities to govern as they please.96 Fidesz party members avoid consulting with 
other parties when advancing their own often controversial legislation. 97 The supermajority 
changed procedural rules that have regulated the passage of bills since the pre-accession era in a 
way that significantly curtails the opposition’s power.98 Fidesz’s decision to pass a new 
constitution in 2012 illustrates their commitment to using their supermajority to change the way 
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that legislation had previously passed. This new constitution increased the number of laws that 
need a supermajority’s support. 99 Even if an opposition party rose to power in the future, it 
would face difficulties making meaningful policy changes because it would need a supermajority 
to overturn many of the provisions that Orban’s government has passed—even though they 
would not have needed a supermajority under the system established before EU accession. 100  
 Beyond altering the way that laws can pass, Orban also changed the EU accession-era 
electoral laws to favor Fidesz. Opposition parties were not consulted.101 Election reforms in 2011 
and 2014 redesigned the electoral system so that even if the opposition parties earn more votes 
than Fidesz in future elections, the opposition would not gain a parliamentary majority. Political 
scientist Gabor Toka created a model that predicts that even if a united center-left opposition 
emerged and gained the same share of votes as Fidesz, it would earn 8 percent fewer seats 
because of changes in the way seats are allocated.102  Electoral reform in 2011 also ended 
Hungary’s parliamentary runoff system, which makes it more difficult for the fragmented parties 
of the left to unite around a leader that could challenge Orban. Before the 2011 reforms, when no 
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candidate earned a majority in the initial elections, the top candidates would have a runoff—
allowing the left and the right to naturally group around a candidate.103 However, over time, the 
right united under Fidesz while the left became increasingly fragmented. Eliminating the runoff 
allows Fidesz to continue to gain votes on the right while parties on the left struggle—and fail—
to unite around a single candidate. 
The new electoral system not only makes it nearly impossible for opposition parties to 
take control of parliament, but also virtually guarantees that Fidesz will retain a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority—without even earning half of the vote.104 With the 2014 electoral 
reforms, Fidesz “designed the election so that the opposition loses even if it wins.”105 This 
system “bizarrely compensates not just the losers, but also the winners,” which will create super-
majorities out of majorities, as opposed to ensuring proportional representation.106  
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By granting voting rights to ethnic Hungarians that live outside of Hungary and do not 
have residency, Fidesz has gained a new electoral base that did not exist at the time of EU 
accession.107 Thanking their benefactors, these new voters “overwhelmingly” vote for Fidesz. 108 
Fidesz has also passed laws that make it difficult and costly for the over half a million Hungarian 
citizens who live or work abroad to vote.  According to an interviewed civil society activist, “the 
people leaving are often critical about the political developments [in Hungary] and are a potential 
source of political opposition, so they are discriminated against in the way they can cast 
votes.”109 Since Hungarian-born citizens living abroad are more likely to vote against Fidesz than 
ethnic Hungarians who recently gained voting rights, Fidesz requires those born in Hungary but 
living abroad to either go to an Embassy or back to Hungary to vote. By contrast, ethnic 
Hungarian voters can vote by mail. 110 For Hungarian-born citizens, voting becomes an 
expensive and time-consuming process, while newly anointed ethnic Hungarian voters can vote 
easily without incurred expenses. The decision to expand the voting base clearly reflects a 
degeneration of rule of law in Hungary, as it disenfranchises and silences likely opposition while 
empowering probable supporters. 
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 Political appointments have further worsened the functioning of rule of law by impinging 
upon the ability of anti-corruption institutions to detect corruption in spending and 
procurement.111 Designed to be independent of other branches of government at the time of EU 
accession, the Prosecutor Service exemplifies the extent to which Orban has meddled with the 
rule of law. After Orban selected and parliament confirmed the chief prosecutor, he began to 
operate without any legislative oversight. When public scandals or corruption cases involving 
Fidesz allies surface, the chief prosecutor’s investigation rarely finds evidence of wrongdoing.112 
However, those associated with opposition parties are harshly investigated and often arrested on 
corruption charges in front of cameras so as to publically humiliate and discredit them.113  
One civil society activist whom I interviewed described the Prosecution Service as “one 
of the most captured and exposed institutions.” 114 The prosecutor’s office does not investigate 
this activist’s reports of misused funds, even though the office is legally bound to investigate and 
release a report with the investigation’s results. Furthermore, according to the activist, “there is 
no way to hold the prosecutor’s office accountable for giving a written resolution with [the] legal 
or factual ground[s] behind why an investigation was dismissed.” 115 The weakening of rule of 
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law institutions in Hungary allows the Prosecution Service to operate without oversight and to 
handle corruption cases in a highly partisan manner. Negative developments related to anti-
corruption institutions is particularly troubling in light of some of the corrupt practices associated 
with the regime.116 
The Orban government’s attack on freedom of the press also threatens the rule of law, as 
press freedom is guaranteed by the Hungarian constitution. One interviewed Hungarian activist 
noted that Fidesz supporters increasingly own media outlets and use the media to advance their 
political interests. As a result, she argued, media has become “the primary propaganda tool of the 
government.” 117 Furthermore, the members of the Media Council, who regulate the functioning 
of the media, have been selected by Orban.118 Though these powers have not yet been used, the 
Media Council can fine media outlets, which creates the “possibility for strong content control,” 
according to one interviewed activist.119 More commonly, the Media Council interferes with the 
radio market, which according to an NGO representative, “is where the Media Council can be 
strong because of the frequency control.”120 On the day that I happened to be interviewing a 
different civil society activist, he stated: 
Today the only nation-wide working commercial radio critical of the Hungarian 
government applied to renew their permit to broadcast. It is owned by an old friend of 
Orban turned enemies in 2014. The National Media Authority says that they won’t 
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extend the radio frequency. Every day, this station reaches 2.5 million people, which 
is huge in a nation of 10 million people. It is very important for democracy. This is a 
very important long-term deterioration of democracy. 121 
 
The decision of Fidesz politicians to undermine the independence of the radio on a random 
Tuesday morning demonstrates the extent to which they have crippled the rule of law in order to 
cement their control. Opposition voices are repressed, while loyalists are rewarded. 
This system of governance contradicts rule of law principles, as Orban frequently 
manipulates the legal system that has existed since EU accession in order to pass legislation in 
controversial and unprecedented ways. One interviewed activist worried that Fidesz “wants to be 
unchangeable and is sacrificing past democratic achievements” to consolidate its political rule.122 
Many of the attacks on the rule of law undermine democratic institutions, which were established 
at EU accession. The institutions functioning at the time of EU accession were strong largely 
because politicians acted in accordance with democratic norms. Despite having strong rule of 
law institutions prior to EU accession, Hungary’s democracy has backslid substantially over the 
past seven years. Thus the strength of rule of law before EU accession does not seem particularly 
important in predicting subsequent levels of democracy in Hungary. 
Romania 
 Even as it acceded to the EU, Romania largely failed to implement rule of law reforms, 
engaging in “window-dressing” tactics.123 However, in recent years, the Romanian government 
has slowly intensified its anti-corruption efforts, which has improved rule of law. Despite this 
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push against corruption, one interviewed NGO activist highlighted that “legislation often isn’t 
observed and Romania’s very complex system is hard to understand, so it is difficult to figure 
out which institution does what.”124 When Romania acceded to the EU, it had confusing, ill-
defined institutional configurations and weak rule of law, which corresponds to democratic 
stagnation in the post-accession period.  
 Early in the democratic transition, Romanian politicians resisted implementing rule of 
law reforms. President Ion Iliescu (1990-1996) and Prime Minister Adrian Nāstase (2000-2004), 
largely obstructed rule of law reforms so as to engage in “rampant self-enriching corruption.”125 
However, societal pressures spurred by EU criticism forced them to improve some aspects of the 
rule of law. During Nāstase’s rule, an anti-corruption bill passed, which required political 
candidates and officeholders to disclose their assets, income, and interests.126 However, this bill 
was not implemented. Corruption reached a level that was “high, even by Romanian standards,” 
with no high-level politicians facing prosecution for corruption.127 Those who investigated 
corruption within Nāstase’s party were threatened and intimidated into dropping cases.128  
A 1997 EU report analyzing Romania’s rule of law described it as unsatisfactory when 
compared to the Copenhagen criteria.129 Initially, instead of legitimately working to curb 
corruption, Romania established a “network of institutions whose areas of responsibility overlap 
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and confuse,” instead of actually fight corruption.130 Even as some analysts of Romania’s 
democracy described improvements in annual reports, politicians continued to avoid 
implementing substantial anti-corruption reform.131 This trend is perhaps best exemplified by the 
appointment of Minister of Justice Teodor Chiuariu in 2007, who maintained his high-ranking 
judicial position while under investigation for corruption.132 When one of the most powerful 
political leaders tasked with fighting corruption profited from engaging in corrupt activities, the 
fight against corruption obviously stalled. 
 Improvements in rule of law and anti-corruption efforts have occurred in recent years at 
both the local and national level. Most NGO leaders whom I interviewed attributed perceived 
improvements in Romania’s democracy to the anti-corruption reforms. One respondent described 
the reforms as causing “the people to make a mental switch” to oppose corruption.133 The 
respondent further cited the impact of high levels of trust in the National Anticorruption 
Directorate (DNA) on the recent success of anti-corruption and democratic reforms: “When there 
were attempts to change the criminal code and anti-corruption legislation, there were protests 
that mobilized quickly in big cities.” 134 She credited these protests—and others—for protecting 
rule of law in Romania by highlighting citizens’ opposition to corruption.  
Despite current political attacks on anti-corruption efforts, several notable corruption 
convictions have occurred in recent years. In October 2015, a director and an editor of a local 
newspaper, Atac de Buzau, were arrested after attempting to blackmail local politicians for 
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advertising contracts.135 Additionally, 2015 saw the arrest and indictment of corrupt anti-
corruption prosecutors.  Recent improvements in anti-corruption efforts can largely be attributed 
to the success of the DNA. In 2015 alone, it investigated a Constitutional Court justice, a 
National Integrity Agency president, a Finance Minister, a Minister of Regional Development 
and Administration, the mayor of Bucharest, a former Transport Minister, and the former Prime 
Minister.136 The DNA has prosecuted high-level officers, even jailing two former prime 
ministers since its inception.  It also investigates both the ruling party and the opposition.137 
Since the DNA prosecutes both sides with equal vigor, it cannot be described as coopted. The 
DNA’s efforts at combatting corruption have improved the rule of law in Romania.138 
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Despite these improvements, some rule of law issues remain significant. In 2015, the 
government manipulated the law in order to justify unconstitutional actions. Corruption 
prosecutions and subsequent resignations opened up several local officials’ positions. While the 
constitution requires that the government hold elections to fill these positions within 90 days, the 
government failed to organize elections. The PNL opposition party sued the government and 
ultimately the Bucharest Court of Appeals mandated that the government organize elections by 
June 7, 2015. Instead of complying with the court’s ruling, the government decided to appoint 
certain people to temporarily fill these local positions.  In order to justify these actions, an 
emergency ordinance was passed to amend the law on local public administration in a way that 
would make this permissible.139 
 The government’s actions in 2015 caused apprehension with NGO activists. One 
interviewed activist described a current “big threat that things [democracy] will go 
backwards.”140 She highlighted legislative proposals from all parties that jeopardize the rule of 
law by weakening and “decreas[ing] the role of the justice system” in anti-corruption 
prosecutions.141 She illustrated this fear by describing a 2016 decision of the government to 
modify the conflict of interest law for parliamentarians in order to cut back past reforms. This 
NGO activist argued that the government’s actions in 2016 demonstrate the overall attempts by 
“the executive and legislative branches to undermine reforms by not implementing them.”142 In 
this environment, rule of law, while improved, still requires significant progress.  
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Even though Romania’s rule of law has strengthened greatly since 2013, its democracy 
continues to stagnate. My hypothesis suggests that, when predicting democratic developments, 
the strength of rule of law at the time of EU accession matters more than changes to rule of law 
after EU accession. Romania offers support for my hypothesis that the strength of institutions at 
the time of EU accession can impact levels of democracy years later. The weakness of rule of 
law at EU accession corresponds to current stagnated levels of democracy in Romania.  
Slovenia 
 Slovenia established the strongest rule of law institutions in the pre-EU accession period 
and maintained the strength of these institutions following accession. Democratic consolidation 
has occurred. These trends suggest that the strength of rule of law institutions at the time of EU 
accession helped place Slovenia on the path to democratic consolidation.  
Slovenia’s use of consensual decision-making has decreased rule of law infringements.143 
Even before EU accession, Slovenian politicians frequently invited a variety of stakeholders to 
participate in the policymaking process. Slovenian politicians also largely avoid manipulating the 
legal system for political gain. Slovenian activists whom I interviewed emphasized that Slovenia 
“is not having issues” with the rule of law “like other countries in the region.”144  
 The constitution that Slovenia passed in 1991 established understandable political 
institutions with clearly delineated responsibilities.  Executive power is split between a cabinet 
government led by a prime minister and a directly elected president.145 One interviewed 
Slovenian civil society activist described the executive branch as gaining more power than the 
legislature; however, he emphasized that this is part of a larger global trend that increasingly 
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imparts authority to the executive. He concluded that this shift in power does not threaten the 
quality of democracy or the rule of law in Slovenia.146  
Some scholars, such as Danica Fink-Hafner, have described Slovenia as a “textbook 
example” of how to establish a functioning democracy.147 Slovenia’s institutionalized system of 
checks and balances further strengthen the rule of law.148 By legally codifying a democratic 
system to create a clear institutional structure and by providing these institutions with adequate 
resources to function effectively, Slovenia developed strong rule of law.149  
 Slovenia’s Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) further reinforces the 
rule of law. Upon its creation, it was given a broad mandate to monitor public corruption.150 
Even as corruption is perceived as one of the largest problems in Slovenia, the prosecution of 
high-profile politicians, business tycoons, and their associates has “intensified” since 2011.151 
 However, some problems with the rule of law remain. Sometimes criminal and civil 
penalties for corruption are not implemented. Enforcement of legislation regulating the 
prosecution of high-level corruption remains weak.152  Furthermore, some interviewed activists 
express concern over alleged cases of politicized prosecution of corruption. Some activists have 
accused parties of not prosecuting their own party members while in power. Others worry that 
high-level officials are not held accountable. Corruption rulings brought down on former Prime 
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Minister Janez Janša and some left-wing politicians have punished them leniently, spurring 
worries that the government is not dedicated to fighting corruption.153  
When three chairmen of the foremost anti-corruption watchdog agency, the Commission 
for the Prevention of Corruption, attributed their resignation in 2013 to the government’s 
insufficient efforts to curb corruption, increasing numbers of citizens lost hope in the fight 
against corruption.154 One interviewed NGO activist asserted that even though there are “some 
trials when government secretaries accept some bribes for services or lobby interested parties” 
and even though “these acts are reported by the mass media, lots of corruption remains on the 
municipality level.”155 However, he went on to say, “corruption isn’t a big enough issue to 
undermine how the government is operating.”156 
Though clearly revitalizing anti-corruption efforts could further improve the rule of law, 
Slovenia has established a fairly well-functioning rule of law. Particularly in comparison to other 
countries in the region, Slovenia is hailed as a success story not only of the democratic transition, 
but also in the establishment of functioning and well-regulated institutions. The strong rule of 
law institutions created at the time of EU accession provided a political norm that shaped how 
politicians thought they should behave. The strength of rule of law in Slovenia in 2004 thus 
seems important in explaining subsequent democratic consolidation.  
Rule of Law Conclusion 
Overall, I have mixed findings for the idea that the strength of rule of law institutions at 
the time of EU accession helps explain whether democracy consolidates years later. While this 
hypothesis seems to match democratic developments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, it does 
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not hold in Hungary. An initially strong rule of law in Slovenia corresponds to democratic 
consolidation later. An initially weak rule of law in Bulgaria is consistent with democratic 
stagnation. The initially weak rule of law in Romania dovetails with democratic stagnation, 
despite the recent strengthening of rule of law. In Hungary, strong rule of law at the time of 
accession did not correspond to democratic deepening. Subsequent actions taken by politicians 
seem more important to democratic developments in Hungary than the initial strength of rule of 
law. In order to assess whether a different aspect of democracy better explains democratic 
developments over time, I will now examine the relationship between judicial strength and 
democratization patterns.  
Table 2.1: Summary of Predictions and Finding for the Relationship between Rule of Law and  
Developments in Democracy 
 Strength of Rule of 
Law at EU Accession 
Predicted Democratic 
Development 
Actual Democratic 
Development 
Bulgaria Weak Stagnation Stagnation 
Hungary Strong Consolidation Backtracking 
Romania Weak Stagnation Stagnation 
Slovenia Strong Consolidation Consolidation  
 
The Strength of Judicial Institutions and Developments in Democracy  
 Many Eastern European countries have struggled to establish judiciaries that effectively 
check the executive and legislature. Even when constitutionally designed to counterbalance the 
power of the other branches, judicial institutions often do not receive either the necessary 
financial support or enough respect to empower them to operate properly. Sometimes ignored 
and frequently under-resourced, in some Eastern European countries, the judiciary cannot 
effectively protect democracy.  This section examines the extent to which judicial strength at the 
time of EU accession impacts the quality of democracy in the four case study countries. 
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The graph below reveals divergences in the strength of judicial institutions for each of the 
four countries both at and since EU accession (Graph 2.3).157 Hungary and Slovenia’s judiciaries 
scored well from 2003 to 2009, indicating the presence of independent and resourced judiciaries 
at EU accession. However, by 2010, Hungary’s judiciary worsened, while Slovenia’s largely 
remained the same. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania’s judiciaries started from a weak 
foundation. Both progressed before acceding to the EU in 2007, but after 2007, both states’ 
judicial institutions worsened until 2011. From 2011 on, Romania improved the quality of its 
judiciary, while Bulgaria’s continued to worsen—albeit receding to a score still better than 
Romania’s. The strength of judicial institutions at the time of EU accession helps explain 
democratic deepening in Slovenia and stagnation in Bulgaria and Romania. However, strong 
judicial institutions present when Hungary acceded to the EU do not improve understandings of 
its democratic backtracking.  
Graph 2.3: Country-Level Judicial Framework and Independence Scores 
 
Source: Freedom House  
                                                
157 The Freedom House Nations in Transit Judicial Framework and Independence scores are measured on a seven-
point scale, where 1 indicates that a judiciary is the most developed and 7 indicates that a judiciary is the least 
developed. The green dotted lines show the year of accession for each of the countries. 
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Bulgaria 
 Bulgaria had a weak and under-resourced judiciary at the time of EU accession and its 
democracy later stagnated, fitting my hypothesis that the presence of a weak and under-resourced 
judiciary at the time of EU accession may correspond to democratic stagnation in later years. 
Even though its judiciary has largely operated independently, this independence should not 
necessarily be construed positively, as the Bulgarian judiciary has frequently failed to prosecute 
corruption and to operate transparently. Bulgaria’s weak and poorly-functioning judiciary at the 
time of EU accession helps explain democratic stagnation in Bulgaria. 
 Before acceding to the EU, constitutional designers of Bulgaria’s judicial institutions 
established an autonomous branch that could check other institutions’ powers. Composed of 
judicial representatives, the Supreme Judicial Council promotes and appoints judges.158 This 
institutional configuration grants the judiciary a degree of independence from other branches. By 
preventing the dismissal of Constitutional Court judges during their non-renewable nine-year 
terms, Bulgaria’s constitution decreases judges’ incentives to rule in a politicized manner.159   
 However, this constitutional design has decreased legislative oversight of the judiciary 
and increased the influence of the Prosecutor-General. One NGO leader described the problem:  
The reforms were supposed to make the judiciary stronger against outside influence, but 
it really made outside influence stronger, gave the prosecutor-general virtually complete 
control over the panel that is supposed to monitor him. The panel that is supposed to 
control and monitor the courts and judges are mostly chosen from politics, so the courts 
are actually more prone to outside political party influence.160  
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The magistrates’ appointments by the Supreme Judicial Council are un-transparent and 
uncompetitive, which further prevents attempts at oversight.  The Supreme Judicial Council can 
“appoint, promote, demote, reassign, or dismiss the justices, prosecutors, and investigating 
magistrates” without needing to consult an additional body. 161  
Furthermore, the prosecution service is overly-dependent upon the Prosecutor General. 
One interviewed NGO leader stated that the Prosecutor General “has the greatest influence and is 
in a way completely unaccountable to anyone for his seven-year terms.”162 The civil society 
activist further noted that “since Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, there have been three or four 
Prosecutor-Generals and all have been accused of influencing trials.”163 Though the constitution 
protects the judiciary from assault by the legislative and executive branches, it also makes it 
difficult for other institutions or citizens to hold the judiciary accountable.164 
Even before EU accession, judges have frequently refused to prosecute high-level 
executive, legislative, and judicial leaders engaged in corruption.165 When high-level corruption 
is prosecuted, the punishment is often ineffective. One interviewed NGO activist described a 
project that distributed 3 million leva (about $1.66 million) from the central budget to 
municipalities for local developments. Four municipalities appealed the selection process 
because all of the distributed funds were given to mayors politically aligned with the ruling 
party. The interviewed activist asserted that “the court ruled that the distribution of money was 
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illegal because it wasn’t transparent, but the court didn’t oblige the municipalities to return the 
money to the budget because the projects were already underway.” 166 Even when judges 
prosecute corruption, the punishment often fails to deter future acts, which brings into question 
the effectiveness of the Bulgarian judiciary in curtailing the corruption of public funds.  
Cognizant of weaknesses in Bulgaria’s judiciary present from the beginning of the 
democratic transition, Minister of Justice Hristo Ivanov attempted to pass judicial reform 
legislation in 2015.  The proposed bill would have increased the transparency of the judiciary and 
decreased the politicization of trials.167 Other politicians proposed a provision to split the duties 
of the Supreme Judicial Council so that different bodies would appoint prosecutors and judges.168 
This bill required constitutional changes and attempts to pass it faced significant difficulties. 
Even though the public largely supported this bill, the Bulgarian parliament removed the most 
substantial sections of reform from this legislation. No meaningful changes to the judiciary 
occurred and Minister of Justice Ivanov resigned in protest.169 One interviewed NGO activist 
expressed discontent with the failure of these reforms, noting that “if the judiciary reforms, then I 
think the implementation of laws and reform in every other sphere would be much better.”170  
Judicial weaknesses and inefficiencies since EU accession reflect the broader failure of 
Bulgaria’s democracy to consolidate. Both judicial institutions and the overall democratic 
environment in Bulgaria have stagnated. The weakness of the judiciary at the time of Bulgaria’s 
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accession made it difficult for subsequent reforms designed to strengthen the judiciary to 
succeed, which helps explain why Bulgaria’s democracy has stagnated. 
Hungary 
 At the time of EU accession, Hungary had a well-resourced and independent judiciary. 
Until 2010, this trend continued and democracy deepened. However, after Fidesz gained a 
legislative supermajority in 2010, its politicians “systematically” attacked checks and balances 
by targeting the court—working to replace, manipulate, and intimidate judges in order to 
increase support for their controversial legislation.171 Democratic backsliding has resulted. Since 
the strength of Hungary’s judiciary at the time of EU accession does not help explain democratic 
backsliding, this section focuses on developments in its judiciary since these attacks began.  
 During the democratic transition, institutional engineers established the Constitutional 
Court as the main check on parliament. Hungary’s institutional design leaves the Constitutional 
Court as “the only institution to review and criticize” parliamentary policies.172 Those engaged in 
Hungary’s institutional engineering process placed a great deal of responsibility in the Court. 
While politicians largely respected it and provided it with the necessary resources prior to 2010, 
after 2010, Fidesz undermined the institution, recognizing the judiciary as its primary constraint. 
 Deploying the supermajority that it gained in 2010, Fidesz altered the way that 
Constitutional Court judges were nominated in order to select new candidates, most of whom 
had a partisan background. 173 Because of the changed “composition” of the court as a result of 
the replacement of former judges, the Constitutional Court ceased its role as a check on the 
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government’s power and became a Fidesz proxy.174 By 2014, Fidesz had replaced 11 of the 
Constitutional Court’s 15 judges—after having increased the total number of judges from eight 
to fifteen.175 One NGO activist that I interviewed underscored that “professional criteria were not 
taken into consideration when picking new judges, which impacts how other institutions operate 
and does not favor democracy.”176 She further stated that “when it comes to the national court 
and politically sensitive cases, decisions are made that favor the government politically.”177 
These politicized appointments of Constitutional Court judges have compromised the strength 
and operation of the judiciary in Hungary. 
By filling nine-year judicial appointments with Fidesz loyalists, the legislative changes 
that Fidesz has made would be difficult for an opposition party to undo should it come to power 
in the future. The ruling party has not downplayed these changes. In May 2013, when Prime 
Minister Orban met with Chief Justice Paczlay, he stated that “the time of constitutional debate is 
over.”178 This anti-democratic statement reveals the extent to which Fidesz has undermined the 
judiciary, removed its constitutional check, and attacked the quality of democracy that existed in 
Hungary at the time of its EU accession. 
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 The Constitutional Court’s new members uphold controversial legislation passed by the 
Fidesz legislative majority—creating a “clear break” in judicial rulings. 179 In 2014, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that new election rules were constitutional. This new electoral system 
redrew district boundaries without consulting the opposition, halved the number of parliamentary 
seats, and reallocated the way that votes are distributed to benefit Fidesz.180 These changes to the 
structure of the judiciary have established a court system that acts as a rubber stamp for Fidesz 
legislation instead of a check on the legislative and executive branches’ power.181 
Additionally, in 2014, the Fourth Amendment of the new Hungarian constitution repealed 
all of the decisions made by the Constitutional Court before the new constitution passed.  This 
decision means that precedent stemming from court decisions made before 2012—including 
those made in order to qualify Hungary for EU accession—can no longer be used to justify 
future rulings.182 Rulings made before Fidesz replaced the judges on the Constitutional Court 
with its political allies are no longer legally permissible precedent. 
 Hungary’s government has also attempted to sideline lower courts. It decreased the 
retirement age of ordinary judges from 70 to 62, which allowed it to “remove almost all of the 
courts’ presidents” as well as one-tenth of all judges.183 It also passed legislation that created a 
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National Judicial Office to appoint new judges to the retiring judges’ positions.184 However, the 
lower courts have maintained some degree of independence.185 One interviewed NGO activist 
described a dual problem: “Low courts often contradict the government, but if they do, the 
government can change the law to prevent these litigations. They can fast track legislation to 
change it whenever existing legislation threatens them.”186 While the lower courts may remain 
independent, they cannot enforce their rulings without the support of the Fidesz government. 
 Overall, Hungary’s government since 2010 broke with the precedent of respecting the 
independence of the judiciary, instead opting to coopt the judicial system. The judiciary can no 
longer effectively check the executive or legislature in the way that it could at the time of EU 
accession. In Hungary, the pre-accession strength of the judiciary does not predict later 
developments in the quality of democracy.   
Romania  
 In Romania, the strength of judicial institutions at the time of EU accession corresponds 
to later levels of democratic stagnation. At the time of its EU accession, Romania had weak 
judicial institutions. Since then, its judicial institutions have only marginally improved. 
Romania’s democracy has stagnated perhaps partially as a result of this initial weakness.  
 Early in the democratic transition, many judges were either corrupt or political proxies.187 
However, the quality of the judiciary somewhat improved in the pre-accession period. One 
interviewed NGO activist noted that the implementation of many of the EU reforms coincided 
with the “creation of a critical mass ready for reform.”188 Many young professionals sought to 
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strengthen the judiciary when they entered it 2004. To shift the balance of power from 
communist judges and prosecutors to their replacements, the National Institute of the Magistracy 
was founded in 1992. One NGO activist asserted that reforms were internalized because: 
New training through the [National] Institute [of the Magistracy] allowed new judges and 
prosecutors aged 24 and 25 to flood the system and to tilt the power balance toward these 
reformed, new leaders and from the Communist judges and prosecutors.189  
 
New personnel who accepted responsibility for the reforms helped the judiciary become a more 
effective institution that could improve the quality of democracy in Romania. These reforms 
occurred prior to Romania joining the EU and contributed to strengthening its weak judiciary—
albeit not to a significant extent. 
Since EU accession, judges and prosecutors have actively sentenced corrupt 
politicians.190 Anti-corruption prosecution has increased in recent years and is often attributed to 
the collaboration between prosecutors and the Romanian Intelligence Agency (SRI).191 
Politicians who fear being prosecuted for corruption or who seek to alleviate their corrupt 
friends’ punishments have attempted to influence judges and constrain their activities. In 2013, 
politicians “heavily advis[ed] and criticiz[ed]” judicial rulings in mostly unsuccessful attempts to 
influence them.192 
 Since the judiciary has become more effective than other institutions of governance, an 
interesting problem has emerged. One interviewed NGO activist who is also a prosecutor stated:  
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People come to the prosecutor’s office for anything because they expect the judiciary will 
solve anything. Only important cases should go to the prosecutor’s office, but this is not 
the case. This is anti-democratic. The fact is that we’ve depended almost exclusively on 
the judiciary to handle everything, which has made democracy unbalanced.193 
 
Romania’s democracy has stagnated. This finding corresponds with my hypothesis, which 
suggests that since Romania’s judicial institutions were weak at the time of EU accession, 
democratic stagnation would continue after accession.  
Slovenia 
 Slovenia’s strong judicial institutions at the time of EU accession correspond to 
democratic deepening in the post-accession period. The establishment of strong judicial 
institutions before Slovenia gained EU membership likely helped it deepen the quality of its 
democracy, as my hypothesis predicts. 
While Freedom House indicators show that Slovenia’s judicial institutions largely 
maintained their strength throughout the post-accession period, some problems continue to 
decrease the quality and effectiveness of these institutions. Even though Slovenia’s judicial 
institutions are significantly stronger than the other three case studies examined, since the 
judiciary is not as strong as other institutions or democratic structural factors, judicial institutions 
may not help us understand why Slovenia’s democracy has succeeded as well as other factors. 
 Some critics of Slovenia’s institutions describe judicial reforms as “shallow” because the 
reform process emphasized how structures appear in law instead of how they operate in 
practice.194 They contend that the courts have been coopted by political interests.195 In 2015, 
several high-profile anti-corruption cases were not tried effectively because of poor judicial 
                                                
193 Confidential. Interview at 11 AM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, June 
26, 2016.  
194 Bugarič, “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe,” 228. 
195 Bugarič, “A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe,” 229. 
  
 
60 
procedure. In the high-profile Patria case, Janez Jansa, Slovenia’s Prime Minister from 2004 to 
2008, was accused of accepting bribes from Patria, a Finnish state-run arms group, in a planned 
contract for 135 armored vehicles.196  While Slovenia’s Ljubljana’s district court ruled that Jansa 
was guilty of accepting bribes and while the Higher Court and Supreme Court upheld the district 
court’s ruling, the Constitutional Court overturned the ruling, citing a lack of evidence.197 The 
Constitutional Court ordered a retrial at the District Court of Ljubljana, which dismissed all 
criminal charges against Jansa.198 The Constitutional Court’s ruling raised concerns that the 
judiciary was neither as independent nor as willing to fight corruption as previously imagined.  
 Some problems with the Slovenian judiciary stem from a gulf between written legislation 
and implementation. The legislation seems to create a fairly strong Constitutional Court, which 
determines whether laws, regulations, and general acts are constitutional and legal.  Beyond 
merely examining the constitutionality of laws, it can also rule on whether citizens’ rights have 
been infringed.199 To monitor the actions of politicians, the constitutional court rules on the 
constitutionality of political parties’ activities and can impeach the president, prime minister, or 
cabinet ministers.200 While the legislation seems well-developed, the government has not 
effectively implemented anti-corruption laws and has kept the criminal justice system under-
                                                
196 Novak, Marja. Review of Slovenian bribery trial against ex-PM Jansa expires, by Tom Heneghan. Reuters, 
September 7, 2015, sec. World News. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovenia-corruption-
idUSKCN0R71KC20150907. 
STA. “Patria Scandal: From Plans to Equip Army to Verdicts and Retrial.” The Slovenia Times, April 23, 2015, sec. 
Politics. http://www.sloveniatimes.com/patria-scandal-from-plans-to-equip-army-to-verdicts-and-retrial. 
198 Haček, Miro. “Slovenia Nations in Transit  2016.” Freedom House, 2016. 
199 Jonsson, Anna. “Changing Concepts of Rights in Post-Communist Societies.” In Democratic Transition in 
Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media, edited by Danica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P Ramet, 1st ed., 
72–96. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 2006. 85. 
200 Jonsson, “Changing Concepts of Rights in Post-Communist Societies,” 85. 
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resourced. 201  Additionally, the Slovenian judiciary remains backlogged, making it difficult for 
the judiciary to consider cases quickly.202  
However, many scholars and NGO activists in Slovenia emphasize that its judiciary is 
much stronger than these characteristics make it seem. While recognizing that Slovenia could 
continue to improve the quality of its judiciary, they cite the stability and strength of its 
institutions to contend that Slovenia has a well-developed judiciary. The original constitutional 
design allows judges to hold their offices for life, which insulates them from political 
pressures.203 Additionally, despite some difficulty prosecuting high-level corruption, such as the 
Jansa-Patria case, politicians have rarely affected court decisions since EU accession. 204  
  The overall impact of the strength of the Slovenian judicial system at the time of EU 
accession appears mixed. Though it has sometimes failed to prosecute high-level corruption, it 
maintains a significant degree of executive and legislative oversight. Furthermore, Slovenia’s 
judiciary is one of the strongest in Eastern Europe. The strong judicial institutions at the time of 
EU accession correspond to subsequent democratic consolidation in Slovenia.  While the 
strength of judicial institutions helps explain democratic consolidation, since the institutions are 
not as effective as other societal and institutional factors, the strength of the judiciary does not 
appear to offer the best explanation of democratic consolidation in Slovenia.  
 
 
                                                
201 “Slovenia Nations in Transit 2015,” 9. 
202 “Country Report Slovenia 2016 Including an In-Depth Review on the Prevention and Correction of 
Macroeconomic Imbalances.” Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission, February 
26, 2016. 62. 
203 “Questionnaire on the Independence of Judges, Their Appointment and Careers, and Funding of the Courts: 
Reply Submitted by Slovenia.” Strasbourg: Consultative Council of European Judges, February 12, 2001. 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=1055629&Site=COE&direct=true. 
204 Hacek et al, “Sustainable Governance Indicators; Slovenia’s Report,” 16. 
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Judiciary Conclusion 
The importance of the strength of the judiciary at the time of EU accession in predicting 
later democratic developments appears mixed. In Bulgaria and Romania, weak pre-accession 
judicial institutions correspond to democratic stagnation in subsequent years. Similarly, in 
Slovenia, a strong pre-accession judiciary coincided with democratic deepening after EU 
accession. However, in Hungary, strong pre-accession judicial institutions were attacked 
beginning in 2010 and democracy backslid, as opposed to consolidated. 
Table 2.2: Summary of Predictions and Findings for the Relationship between Judicial Strength  
and Developments in Democracy  
 Strength of Judiciary 
at EU Accession 
Predicted Democratic 
Development 
Actual Democratic 
Development 
Bulgaria Weak Stagnation Stagnation 
Hungary Strong Consolidation Backtracking 
Romania Weak Stagnation Stagnation 
Slovenia Strong Consolidation Consolidation  
 
Institutional Engineering Chapter Conclusion  
 My hypothesis suggested that the strength of both rule of law and judicial institutions at 
the time of EU accession would predict levels of democratic consolidation in later years. Applied 
to my cases, the strong rule of law and judicial institutions established in Hungary and Slovenia 
at the time of EU accession were expected to correspond to democratic deepening, while the 
weak rule of law and judicial institutions present at the time of Bulgaria and Romania’s EU 
accession were expected to correspond to democratic stagnation. I found support for this 
hypothesis in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.  
Developments in Romania’s rule of law reveal the greatest support for my hypothesis. 
Even after Romania’s rule of law institutions strengthened in the post-accession period, its 
democracy still stagnated. However, this stagnation is likely due to a confluence of other factors. 
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The weakness of rule of law institutions at the time of EU accession alone likely does not 
independently drive current levels of democratic stagnation in Romania. Hungary also proved an 
outlier by contradicting my hypothesis to the greatest degree. Even though it developed strong 
rule of law and judicial institutions in the pre-accession period, its democracy backslid.  
 My findings indicate that the political structure established by institutional engineering at 
the time of EU accession, though a contributor to future levels of democracy, may not be the 
most important factor in predicting the quality of democracy years later. Changes in institutions 
after EU accession may better explain the levels of democracy in the post-accession period. In 
particular, those changes made to democratic institutions by either pro-democratic or anti-
democratic leaders that are permitted by society may most affect the quality of democracy in a 
country. My next chapter taps into these ideas by examining the extent to which political culture 
and societal factors affect the consolidation of democracy in a country. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURE AND 
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING 
 
Political Culture Hypotheses 
 
  My literature review suggested four primary pathways through which political culture 
impacts democratization in Eastern Europe.  First, whether citizens define democracy in liberal 
terms affects the success of democratic consolidation. I hypothesize that when citizens of a state 
understand democracy in liberal terms, democracy will likely deepen. However, when citizens 
do not understand democracy in liberal terms, stagnation or backtracking is more likely. 
Second, the presence of a resourced and freely operating civil society may influence 
democratization. I expect that states with well-resourced and participatory civil societies will be 
more likely to deepen their democracies. However, when national governments coopt or limit the 
functioning of CSOs, democratic backtracking and stagnation will likely occur.205 
Citizens’ participation in democratic activities may impact the democratization process 
because they can demand that their politicians listen to their views. I hypothesize that in 
countries where citizens’ participation in political activities and civil society is higher, the 
democratic institutions will be more likely to consolidate. However, when citizens infrequently 
engage in democratic activities, democratic institutions will be more vulnerable to backtracking.  
Finally, citizens’ levels of trust in democratic institutions can constrain political elites’ 
activities. I hypothesize that trust in the EU and trust in national governments operate in 
                                                
205 The extent to which civil society organizations (CSOs) are well-resourced and participatory largely depends on 
three factors. First, a legal environment that consistently regulates and protects the operation of civil society must 
exist. CSOs also must have access to funding that allows them to finance their operations. Finally, the government 
must be open to civil society consultations on legislation and CSOs must have the capacity to present reasonable 
critiques and suggestions for government policies.  
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opposition to each other.206 When trust in the EU is higher than trust in national governments, 
democratic consolidation will become increasingly probable. By contrast, when citizens trust 
their national governments more than the EU, democratic stagnation and backtracking will be 
more likely to occur.  
Methodology 
 By using an ordered logit regression, this section tests which of these hypotheses seem to 
hold. After this statistical analysis, I use qualitative analysis to examine whether my model 
matches with other sources of qualitative data in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia.  
Survey limitations prevent me from statistically testing the direct impact of political 
culture on democratic backtracking. Using changes in levels of democracy as the dependent 
variable would not have provided enough variation in the model. Instead, I explored 
respondents’ support for democracy as a dependent variable. Support for democracy is the 
closest measure of democratic backtracking available in the World Values Survey, as democracy 
is less likely to backtrack if citizens support democracy as a way of governing.  
The available survey years further limit the validity my quantitative analysis. The World 
Values Survey was the only survey to occur in each of the four case countries and to tap into the 
aspects of political culture that interest me. Unfortunately, 1995 and 2005 are the two most 
recent years that this survey was conducted. Both iterations are quite outdated, particularly as 
Bulgaria and Romania had yet to join the EU in 2005. However, after considering other surveys’ 
methodologies and questions, I found the World Values Survey to be the best option available. 
The weaknesses in the applicability of the survey data to my research question motivated me to 
                                                
206 Trust in the EU may signify a greater commitment to liberal democratic norms, while trust in national 
government may represent a turn inwards and a desire to focus on achieving the outcome that is best for one’s 
country regardless of the democratic—or anti-democratic—process used. 
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incorporate NGO testimonial, expert reports, and scholarly work to further analyze these 
hypotheses in a later section of this chapter.   
Descriptive Statistics on the Ordered Logistics Regression Model 
Overall, during the World Value Survey Wave 3 (1995), the individual country-level 
distribution of the variables did not systematically or substantially differ from the combined 
regional average. While Bulgarians and Slovenians had higher than average support for 
democracy as a way of governing their country, Romanians’ scores were lower.207 Hungarians’ 
scores fell approximately at the mean. Fairly substantial regional and country-level changes 
occurred on the dependent variable from 1995 to 2005. Overall, more people responded 
positively to democracy as a form of governance. The 0.4 increase seems substantial on a four-
point scale. Only Hungary fell significantly below the regional average of satisfaction with 
democracy in 2005; however, Hungarians still increased their satisfaction with democracy by a 
substantial 0.27 points. All three remaining countries also increased their satisfaction with 
democracy scores: by 0.29 in Bulgaria, by 0.73 in Romania, and by 0.21 in Slovenia.  
In both surveys, levels of civic involvement were very low—with regional levels falling 
from an average of 1.09 activities per person to 0.64 activities per person from 1995 to 2005. 
Liberal understandings of democracy decreased over this time period by 0.18 points on a five-
point scale. By contrast, trust in the EU relative to the national government increased by 0.07 
points across the region.  More descriptive statistics are presented in Table A2 of the Appendix.  
                                                
207 My dependent variable measures support for democracy as a way of governing. The exact question issued by the 
World Values Survey is: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each 
as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad 
way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 3 1995-1998 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.2014092 World Values Survey 
Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 5 2005-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.2014042 World Values Survey 
Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN. 
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Having examined the key descriptive statistics, I now turn to the ordered logistic 
regressions that I ran to examine the extent to which my hypotheses hold.208 The dependent 
variable in all of these hypotheses is the extent to which a respondent thinks a democratic 
political system is a good way of governing his or her country. This section only tests three of 
the four hypotheses described in the introduction—all of which are restated below. After using 
statistical modelling, I will examine all four hypotheses qualitatively in the following section.  
Table 3.1: Ordered Logit Model Predicting Respondents’ Favorability Towards Democracy in their  
Country in 1995209 
Independent Variable Four Country Average  Bulgaria Hungary Romania Slovenia  
Liberal Understanding of 
Democracy 
-0.16* 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
-0.29* 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
Civic Engagement -0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.26** 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Confidence in EU Relative to 
National Government 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
Education Level -0.16** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.36** 
(0.09) 
Income Level -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
Cut Threshold 1 -0.85 
(0.14) 
-0.83 
(0.27) 
-0.46 
(0.37) 
0.26 
(0.29) 
-1.72 
(0.28) 
Cut Threshold 2 -0.73 
(0.14) 
-0.64 
(0.27) 
-0.37 
(0.37) 
0.34 
(0.29) 
-1.58 
(0.28) 
Cut Threshold 3 1.54 
(0.15) 
1.92 
(0.29) 
2.15 
(0.40) 
2.23 
(0.31) 
0.81 
(0.28) 
Log Likelihood -3380.36 -861.61 -551.33 -911.68 -939.66 
Model chi-square 44.62** 17.14** 6.09 13.51** 29.29** 
N 3,322 802 571 1,062 887 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
208 More descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix.  
209 See Appendix Table A1 for information on coding. 
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Table 3.2: Ordered Logit Model Predicting Respondents’ Favorability Towards Democracy in their  
Country in 2005210 
Independent Variable Four Country Average  Bulgaria Hungary Romania Slovenia  
Liberal Understanding of 
Democracy 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.24 
(0.18) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
0.23 
(0.15) 
Civic Engagement 0.12** 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
Confidence in EU Relative 
to National Government 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.22) 
Education Level -0.36** 
(0.06) 
-0.42** 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.57** 
(0.10) 
-0.33** 
(0.13) 
Income Level -0.26** 
(0.05) 
-0.52** 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.26* 
(0.12) 
Cut Threshold 1 -6.04 
(0.28) 
-1.81 
(0.40) 
-6.98 
(1.15) 
-5.75 
(0.43) 
-5.35 
(0.58) 
Cut Threshold 2 -0.71 
(0.20) 
-1.16 
(0.40) 
0.59 
(0.55) 
-0.89 
(0.33) 
-0.52 
(0.46) 
Cut Threshold 3 -0.02 
(0.20) 
• 1.59 
(0.56) 
-0.44 
(0.33) 
0.43 
(0.46) 
Log Likelihood -2094.89 -521.03 -365.66 -672.97 -468.03 
Model chi-square 117.02** 67.52** 3.48 51.84** 24.74** 
N 2,556 648 533 849 526 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
 
Modelling Understandings of Liberal Democracy 
 I hypothesize that when citizens of a state understand democracy in liberal, democratic 
terms, support for democracy as a form of governance will likely be higher than when they do 
not share liberal preconceptions of democracy. When citizens understand democracy liberally, 
they may be more likely to hold their politicians accountable or to vote out politicians who do 
not behave in liberal, democratic ways. Democracy will be more likely to deepen. When citizens 
express illiberal values, by contrast, I expect support for democracy to fall and democracy to be 
more likely to stagnate or backtrack.  
                                                
210 See Appendix Table A1 for information on coding. 
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I used World Values Survey questions to create an index that calculated the extent to 
which citizens express liberal, democratic preferences.211 In a democratic system where people 
understand democracy in liberal terms, democratic process will be emphasized over the outcome 
of governing. These measures sought to tap into the respondents’ views of the relative 
importance of government outcomes and democratic decision-making processes. Those who 
preferenced giving people a say in important government decisions and protecting freedom of 
speech over maintaining order in the nation and fighting rising prices gained points.212 On this 
two-point scale, two represents the most liberal understanding of democracy possible, while zero 
represents the least liberal understanding of democracy.  
After running regressions, I do not find support for my hypothesis that when citizens 
understand democracy in liberal terms their support for democracy as a way of governing their 
country increases. The regressions were statistically insignificant in almost every case. In 1995, 
only the regressions for the combined four countries and Romania have statistically significant 
outcomes—and these outcomes suggest the opposite of my hypothesis. The more liberal a 
respondent’s understanding of democracy in the combined four countries and in Romania in 
1995, the more likely they were to believe democracy was a bad way of governing their country. 
                                                
211 “If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would 
be the next most important?” The options were “Maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in 
important government decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech.” Giving people more say 
in important government decisions and protecting freedom of speech were coded as liberal values, while the other 
two options were coded as illiberal values, as the illiberal values emphasize order over process.  
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 5 2005-2008. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 3 1995-1998. 
212 Since giving people more of a say in decision-making and protecting freedom of speech support democratic 
processes, respondents who prioritized these options were given a point. However, those who emphasized 
maintaining order in the nation or fighting rising prices expressed views that underscored the importance of the 
outcome of a government decision as opposed to the way that this decision was made. Thus, those respondents did 
not receive a point. One important caveat exists. Low-income respondents might state that they thought that the 
government should focus on fighting rising prices. For them, fighting rising prices would improve their standard of 
living. To examine whether these two variables were correlated, I ran a correlation command in Stata. The results 
can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix. All correlations were very close to 0, so I consider them near negligible. 
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However, the general lack of a relationship and the low p-value when a relationship was found 
does not inspire confidence in using liberal definitions of democracy to predict views towards 
democracy as a form of governance.  
My findings indicate that the extent to which citizens express liberal values may not shift 
support for democracy. As a result, I am hesitant to suggest any conclusions on the way that 
these liberal values affect democratic consolidation. However, the next section of this chapter 
examines some key findings that suggest advancing civic education may improve the quality of 
democracy in a country. Furthermore, since the most recent iteration of this survey was 
completed in 2005 and the next iteration will not be released for several years, this survey’s 
timing does not allow me to adequately tap into changes over time in liberal understandings of 
democracy. For these reasons, after I complete my statistical analysis, I will analyze each 
country qualitatively to examine more recent changes to this aspect of political culture.  
Modelling Civic Engagement 
 My second hypothesis anticipates that when civic participation is higher, support for 
democratic governance will also be higher. These high levels of political activity should 
counteract backsliding in democratic institutions. By contrast, I hypothesize that when people 
participate less actively in civil society, they will be less likely to support democratic governance 
and democracy will be more vulnerable to backsliding.  
Civic engagement takes a variety of forms, from participating in explicitly political 
activities to participating in arts organizations. Since civic engagement remains quite low across 
Eastern Europe in general, I adopted a broad definition of civic engagement so as to maximize 
the likelihood of finding variation in levels of participation. My index used to calculate civic 
engagement includes organizations related to art, music, and education, churches, trade unions, 
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political parties, environmental organizations, professional associations, and charities. I also 
incorporated respondents’ past participation in a petition, boycott, or demonstration into the 
index.213 These measures aptly assess the degree to which citizens in these four countries 
participate in political or civic life on a 10-point scale. The overall descriptive statistics reveal a 
low average level of civic involvement—with the average person in each of the four countries 
being involved in 1.1 organizations in 1995 and 0.64 organizations in 2005. These low levels of 
participation may affect the strength of any potential relationship found in the regression.  
Overall, civic engagement does not seem particularly helpful in predicting a respondent’s 
views towards democracy as a way of governing. In 1995, the regression is only statistically 
significant in Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria, the higher the respondents’ levels of civic 
participation, the more likely they were to oppose democracy as a way of governing. By contrast, 
in Romania, respondents who engaged more civically were more likely to support democracy as 
a way of governing their country. These results differed substantially in 2005. In 2005, 
statistically significant findings for the region suggest that respondents who engaged civically 
were more likely to support democracy as a way of governing their country. However, these 
findings were not statistically significant in any of the country-level regressions. 
                                                
213 The question asked: “Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? Church or 
religious organization, Art, music or educational organization, Labor union, Political party, Environmental 
organization, Professional association, charitable association.”  
It is important to note that I opted to combine active and inactive members into one category with the same point 
value. After running the full analysis twice by counting only active in the first set of regressions as well as both 
active and inactive members in the second set of regressions, I did not find a difference in the regressions. The same 
relationships were significant or insignificant to the same degrees. 
The second question asked: “Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of 
political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of 
these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it. Signing a petition, Joining in 
boycotts, Attending lawful demonstrations.” 
I ignored any expressed intentions of future action and only counted those who had completed the activity. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 5 2005-2008. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 3 1995-1998. 
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Since these relationships seemed surprising and somewhat contradictory, I re-ran the 
regression, but excluded religious involvement from the index. Perhaps members of religious 
groups were less likely to support democracy, as they may have felt that their politicians did not 
represent their religious views or these respondents may have favored a more autocratic structure 
of rule. Even when excluding religious organizations, the same findings as noted above held.   
It appears that civic engagement does not predict support for democracy as a way of 
governing a country in Eastern Europe, as the relationship found was either not statistically 
significant or operated in several different directions. While these findings may suggest that 
levels of civil society engagement might not matter much in terms of predicting support for 
democracy, the types of civic engagement may impact democratic consolidation. Perhaps other 
factors associated with civil society, such as the availability of funding, the willingness of the 
government to consult with these organizations, and the public image of NGOs matters more 
than overall levels of participation. As mentioned before, the timing of the surveys further raises 
concern about the validity of these results. The qualitative section of this chapter examines 
whether these conditions, which the World Values Survey does not measure, appear important. 
Modelling Relative Levels of Trust in the EU and National Governments   
The final hypothesis that I tested examined the influence of trust in the EU relative to 
trust in one’s national government on the extent to which people support democracy as a way of 
governing. Since the EU helped Eastern European countries democratize, it is likely held up as a 
democracy-promoter in the region.214 As Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia all have 
                                                
214 Several scholars have argued that there is a perceived democratic deficit in the EU, as many functions originally 
reserved for the national government have been transferred over to unelected EU authorities. My thesis, however, 
examines the role of the EU in helping to establish democratic institutions in Eastern Europe as opposed to the 
extent to which current levels of power are balanced between the EU and national governments.  
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politicians who corrupt government resources, people who favor the national government 
relative to the EU may find democracy less favorable.215  
In order to calculate the levels of relative trust in the EU to national governments, I 
subtracted the respondent’s confidence in the national government from their confidence in the 
EU.216 The descriptive statistics reveal a tenth of a point rise in trust in the EU relative to 
national governments from 1995 to 2005. This tenth of a point increase is noticeable, albeit not 
large, on a four-point scale.217 Examining the ordered logit regressions, I do not find statistically 
significant results at either the regional or country-level analysis. Thus I do not find support for 
my hypothesis that trust in the EU relative to trust in the national government matters in 
predicting the likelihood of a respondent finding democracy a good way to govern. While these 
results indicate that no relationship seems to exist, since other scholars have yet to examine this 
hypothesis, my findings suggest that this either conscious or unconscious decision by scholars to 
not test this hypothesis was a good one.    
 
                                                
215 When trust in the EU is higher than trust in national governments, citizens might be more likely to support 
democracy as a way of governing. Perhaps those with lower levels of trust in their national governments and higher 
levels of trust in the EU understand the ideal form of democracy, but recognize that their countries have yet to 
sufficiently democratize. In these countries, democratic consolidation will be increasingly probable because citizens 
may have higher expectations of their leaders. By contrast, when citizens trust their national governments more than 
the EU, they may not expect or want full democratization to occur. Those who trust their national government more 
than the EU may think that their government is performing at an adequate democratic level—even if it has yet to 
fully consolidate and adopt all EU norms. In these countries, democratic stagnation and backtracking will become 
more likely than democratic deepening because people may not be as incentivized to push their politicians to 
commit to more liberal, democratic reforms. 
216 The question asked, “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all? The government in your capital. The European Union.” 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 5 2005-2008. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 3 1995-1998. 
217 The descriptive statistics reveal that the vast majority of people trust the EU and national governments about 
equally. Since I subtracted trust in the EU from trust in the national government, the fact that most people scored a 
zero indicates that the majority of respondents trust or distrust the EU and national government equally. If most 
people trust or distrust both institutions about equally, there may be some other relationship between trust in the EU 
and national government. 
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Modelling Control Variables 
 My model also contained two control variables: educational attainment and income.218 
Education may influence the extent to which respondents express support for democracy as a 
way of governing their countries. The more educated the respondent, the more likely the 
respondent is to hold liberal values that encourage support for democracy. I find mixed support 
for the effect of education on regime preferences. In 1995, across the region, increasing one’s 
educational attainment increases the likelihood that one will view democracy as a bad way of 
governing one’s country. The same relationship holds in Romania—with both relationships 
statistically significant to the p-value of 0.05. However, no statistically significant relationship is 
present in Bulgaria, Hungary, or Slovenia. In 2005, increasing levels of educational attainment 
decreases support for democracy as a way of governing a country in the region overall and in 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia. These relationships are all statistically significant to the p-
value of 0.01, while Hungary’s correlation coefficient is not statistically significant.  
This negative relationship counters the literature, which overwhelmingly suggests that 
people who are more educated are more likely to support democracy. Surprised by my findings, I 
examined the marginal effect of education on support for democracy by using the Long and 
Freese commands. Upon further analysis, the relationship between education and regime 
preferences does not appear substantively significant. A one-unit increase in levels of 
educational attainment decreases support for democracy as a way of governing by 0.04 in 1995 
                                                
218 The World Values Survey question measuring educational attainment asks, “What is the highest educational level 
that you have attained?” Possible responses include: no formal schooling, completed primary school, completed 
secondary school, some university, and completed university. The World Values Survey question measuring income 
level asks, “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper 
or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, 
working class, or lower class.”  
See Appendix Table A2 for coding information. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 5 2005-2008. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY Wave 3 1995-1998. 
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and by 0.01 of a point in 2005. Since these marginal shifts on a four-point scale are quite small, it 
appears that education is not the primary driver of support for democracy and barely contributes 
to explanations of support for democracy. While my model’s results run counter to the literature, 
additional statistical analysis shows that the marginal effect of education on support for 
democracy as a way of governance in my model is too small to merit acknowledgment.  
 Identification with a particular socioeconomic class also does not seem to be an important 
determinant of support for democracy. In 1995, the relationship between class status and 
preference for democracy as a way of governing was not statistically significant in the region or 
any country. By contrast, in 2005, the relationship was statistically significant to a p-value of 
0.01 at the regional level and in Bulgaria, as well as to a p-value of 0.05 in Slovenia. In these 
three cases, the higher a respondent’s class, the less likely the respondent was to support 
democracy as a way of governing his country. In Hungary and Romania, however, the 
relationship fell short of statistical significance. While these findings also run counter to the 
literature, by examining the marginal effect of increasing income on support for democracy once 
again, it is clear that the shift is too small to be consequential. Increasing a respondent’s income 
by one class makes a respondent 0.04 of a point more likely to think democracy is a bad way of 
governing in 2005. This minuscule shift suggests that income is not a good predictor of whether 
a respondent supports democracy as a way of governing. Overall, income levels do not appear 
particularly important in predicting democratic preferences.  
Examining the Importance of Political Culture Qualitatively  
This section more closely examines the ways in which political culture affects democratic 
outcomes. The survey analysis presented in the previous section suggests that having illiberal 
values and being involved in civil society decreases the likelihood of respondents preferring 
  
 
76 
democracy as a way of governing their country. Though I was unable to use survey data to test 
the relationship between these measures of political culture and my outcome of interest—
democratic backtracking—, I conducted interviews with NGO leaders to more directly, albeit 
subjectively, explore this relationship. In this section, in-person and Skype interviews conducted 
throughout 2016 and 2017 with leaders of non-governmental organizations in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovenia will provide unique insights on and supplement information from 
previously published scholarly, governmental, and non-governmental work.219  
Citizens’ Understanding of Democracy 
Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovenian citizens’ understandings of democracy 
impact the extent to which their democracies have backslid, stagnated, or consolidated.  The 
survey analysis presented in the previous section suggests that the more that citizens have liberal, 
democratic views, the less supportive they are of democracy. However, the qualitative analysis 
of interview data used in this section demonstrates some degree of support for the hypothesis that 
in states where citizens share a common understanding of liberal democracy, democracy is more 
likely to deepen than in states where citizens do not share the same preconceptions of liberal 
norms. Based on the weaknesses of the quantitative data, namely the outdated surveys and 
inability to discern whether citizens expressed a preference for democracy based on how their 
government performed or how they felt about democracy as a system of governance, I trust the 
findings associated with the qualitative data more when these two analyses differ.  
Bulgaria 
 My statistical analysis suggests that liberal understandings of democracy do not predict 
support for democracy as a form of government in Bulgaria. However, my qualitative analysis 
                                                
219 See Appendix Table A4 for information about the number and types of interviewed civil society organizations.  
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indicates that the underlying problem may be that Bulgarians generally do not define democracy 
in liberal terms because of the failure of civic education to make inroads. One interviewed 
Bulgarian civil society activist stated, “Young people nowadays are not well-aware of what 
democracy means.” 220 This activist expressed the need for formal education on the meaning of 
democracy and the role of citizens in it.  Some laws exist, which mandate the teaching of civics 
in schools. For example, Bulgaria’s Law of General Education requires all high school students 
to pass a civic education exam; however, this policy is rarely implemented. Even when students 
learn civics, the courses focus on institutional rules and citizens’ duties, without teaching 
students how to engage in the democratic process. 221 
 By teaching citizens’ duties, instead of encouraging students to become active in political 
processes or fully defining what democracy means, Bulgarian schools have largely failed to 
spread a liberal definition of democracy. As a result, a large number of Bulgarians still do not 
understand democracy in liberal terms. An environment where citizens do not know how 
democracy should operate potentially creates an arena that allows anti-democratic actors to 
mobilize citizens around illiberal notions of democracy. If this occurs in the future, Bulgaria may 
be vulnerable to democratic backsliding. Currently, however, illiberal understandings of 
democracy contribute to democratic stagnation, as many people do not have clear conceptions of 
how Bulgaria’s democracy should operate.  
Hungary 
In the statistical analysis presented in the last section, I unexpectedly found that the more 
liberal a respondent’s understanding of democracy, the less likely they were to support 
                                                
220 Confidential. Interview at 7:30 PM with a Bulgarian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, July 11, 
2016. 
221 Dimitrov, Georgi, and Elena Stoykova. “Why Sociology Has a Marginal Position in Civic Education in 
Bulgaria.” Journal of Social Science Education 8, no. 4 (2009): 43–56. 
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democracy as a way of governing Hungary. However, respondents’ views towards democracy as 
a way of governing could result from a perceived lack of success in the democratic transition—
perhaps economically, socially, or politically. Instead of reflecting whether or not they thought 
that democracy was a good way of governing their country, respondents may have judged how 
well democracy worked in Hungary at the time. Thus, this section examines other evidence of a 
potential link between understandings of liberal democracy, support for democratic government, 
and democratic backsliding in Hungary. 
The quick democratic transition may be somewhat responsible for the failure of 
Hungarians to understand democracy in liberal terms. I interviewed a Hungarian NGO activist, 
who stated, “The top-down process of democratic transition was too fast. It wasn’t enough time 
for Hungarian society to understand democratic values.” 222 She further argued that the transition 
over-emphasized legal and institutional change, but that “the real democratic values and the 
pressure on democratic education was missing, which is the main reason of the failed 
transition.”223 One study concluded that civics teachers are not formally trained in civics, which 
prevents students from fully understanding how democracy should function.224 Hungary’s 
National Core Curriculum strives to teach students about citizenship by focusing on their identity 
as Hungarians, their duties as citizens, and how to act appropriately within Hungarian society.225 
However, civics education does not prepare Hungarians to exert their rights as citizens or to 
protest the government’s actions.  
                                                
222 Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington, August 2, 2016. 
223 Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington, August 2, 2016. 
224 Fesnic, Florin N. “Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy? Hungary and Poland Compared.” 
Political Studies 64, no. 4 (2016): 966–78. 
225 Davies, Ian, Märta Fülöp, Merryn Hutchings, Alistair Ross, and Ibolya Vari-Szilagyi. “Enterprising Citizens? 
Perceptions of Citizenship Education and Enterprise Education in England and Hungary.” Educational Review 53, 
no. 3 (2001): 261-269. 
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Hungary has neglected to create programs and institutions that inform citizens of how 
liberal democracy operates. Without this type of civic education, Hungarians are unlikely to 
define democracy in liberal terms, which may affect Hungary’s level of democracy. Academic 
Florin Fesnic argues that young Hungarian voters are more likely to vote for authoritarian 
candidates, such as Viktor Orban, than older Hungarian voters. Fesnic also contends that the 
supposed failure of civic education in Hungary and authoritarian voting trends of young 
Hungarians helps explain democratic backsliding in Hungary.226 My analysis concurs with his 
findings. The lack of effective civic education in Hungary has confused the meaning of liberal 
democracy among Hungarians. In this environment, anti-democratic politicians find it fairly easy 
to pursue policies that result in democratic backtracking.  
Romania 
 Romanian citizens do not seem to share liberal conceptions of democracy. One activist 
noted, “There is a lack of constant education in the basic legal process and the democratic 
principle of the rule of law. There is not a critical mass that demands democracy.” 227 She argued 
that the result was a “generation that does not understand how the democratic process works.” 228  
Romania’s official policies mandate civics education; however, the implementation of 
these policies remains poor. For example, Romanian legislation requires students to study civics 
in third, fourth, seventh, and eighth-grades. 229 However, most Romanian third and fourth grade 
teachers are not trained in civics. In rural areas, seventh and eighth grade civics teachers often 
                                                
226 Fesnic, “Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy?” 966. 
227 Confidential. Interview at 11 AM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, June 
26, 2016. 
228 Confidential. Interview at 11 AM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, June 
26, 2016. 
229 Rus, Calin. “The Model of Organised Hypocrisy Applied to Romanian Civic Education Policies and Practices.” 
Journal of Social Science Education 9, no. 1 (2008): 112–20. 
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specialize in unrelated disciples, such as math or sports. 230 Beyond the natural difficulties of 
teaching a subject that one knows little about, teachers are further handicapped by a law that 
forbids teachers from “deal[ing] in politics at school.”231 Teachers feel that they cannot discuss 
political issues in the classroom, so they discourage students from debating policies and 
challenging their teachers’ views.232 
The theory that when citizens do not understand democracy in liberal terms, institutions 
will be more vulnerable to stagnation appears relevant in Romania. While this theory may help 
explain why Romania’s democracy stagnated for several years, it does not explain recent 
improvements to the rule of law. The presence of less liberal definitions of democracy thus may 
not help explain Romania’s democratic developments as well as other factors. 
Slovenia 
In contrast to the previously examined case studies, Slovenians seem to define democracy 
liberally. Between 1996 and 1999, Slovenia reformed its educational system to teach students 
about democratic citizenship. Educating students about citizenship in a democracy has been 
hailed as “one of the underlying principles of modern education” in Slovenia.233 Its national 
elementary school curriculum, for example, requires that students in 7th and 8th grade take a Civic 
Education and Ethics course—and this requirement is implemented.234  
One positive result of these policies is that Slovenian citizens prioritize “engaged 
citizenship norms” over “duty-based” citizenship norms.235 While duty-based citizenship norms 
                                                
230 Rus, “The Model of Organised Hypocrisy,” 118. 
231 Tobin, Kerri. “Civic Education in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Post-Communist Poland and Romania.” 
Journal of Research in International Education 9, no. 3 (2010): 273–88. 
232 Tobin, “Civic education in emerging democracies,” 281. 
233 Neubauer, Tit. “A Critical Review of International Studies into Citizenship and Citizenship Education: Lessons 
for Citizenship Education in Slovenia.” Journal of Social Science Education 11, no. 1 (April 1, 2012): 81–102. 
234 Krek, Janez, and Mojca Kovač Sēbart. “Citizenship Education in Slovenia after the Formation of the Independent 
State.” Journal of Social Science Education 9, no. 1 (2008): 68–80. 
235 Coffee, Hilde, and Tanja Van Der Lippe. “Citizenship Norms in Eastern Europe.” Social Indicators Research 96, 
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emphasize actions such as always obeying the law, serving the country, and voting, engaged 
citizenship norms highlight the importance of forming one’s own opinions, being active in 
politics, and volunteering.236 When Slovenian citizens prioritize these engaged citizenship 
norms, they participate more deeply in the democratic process. They emphasize the process of 
democratic decision-making over the outcome, and when they do not agree with the outcome, 
they will be more likely to debate it instead of blindly accept it. For these reasons, Slovenian 
citizens seem to define democracy in liberal democratic terms more than any other case 
examined in this paper. These liberal understandings of democracy help explain democratic 
deepening in Slovenia since EU accession. 
Strength of Civil Society 
 In general, East European states have poorly-resourced civil society organizations 
(CSOs). This observation holds true in the four cases examined. However, some degree of 
variation in the extent to which CSOs can access the government and work with them to 
convince them to develop policies exists. Since this hypothesis could not be tested in my 
statistical model, I only analyze it through a qualitative lens.  
USAID scores help visualize the differences in civil society strength, as these scores 
measure different countries’ levels of civil society organization development annually on a scale 
from most developed (1) to least developed (7). Graph 3.1 shows the four cases’ civil society 
strength over time.237 Despite being the most consolidated democracy, Slovenia has some of the 
least developed levels of civil society. By contrast, Hungary originally had the most developed 
                                                
no. 3 (2010): 479–96. 
236 Dalton, Russell J. “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation.” Political Studies 56 (2008): 
76–98. 
237 “The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” United States Agency for 
International Development’s Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, 2015. 
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CSOs, which have weakened—much like its democracy—significantly since 2010. Romania and 
Bulgaria have moderately weak civil society—falling largely between Hungary and Slovenia, 
except for in recent years, as Slovenia’s civil society improves and Hungary’s worsens. 
Graph 3.1: Country-Level Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index 
 
Source of Data: USAID Civil Society Sustainability Index238 
 
These civil society sustainability scores reflect recent developments in these countries’ 
politicians’ actions. While Hungarian politicians most effectively coopt nongovernmental 
organizations—at least since 2010—Bulgarian and Romanian politicians often fail to implement 
relevant civil society legislation. Some Slovenian NGOs also face difficulties influencing 
government decisions. Variations in the strength of civil society organizations and these 
governments’ different relationships with civil society shed light on the case study countries’ 
different levels of democratic consolidation—or the lack thereof.  
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Bulgaria 
Bulgarian civil society remains quite weak, as the government frequently excludes NGOs 
from decision-making processes. The marginalization of civil society likely contributes to 
democratic stagnation in Bulgaria. However, since demonstrations against government 
mismanagement spread in 2013, NGOs have occasionally impacted the policy-making process.  
In 2015, for example, the NGO Justice for All participated in judicial reform discussions. 
The year also saw trade unions and professional associations shape a pension reform bill.239  
However, the legislative framework for the public’s role in the policymaking process remains 
underdeveloped.240 Though this legislation has slowly improved over the years and has given 
civil society more tools to engage in the decision-making process, according to an interviewed 
activist, “the implementation of the laws is worse.”241 Even when the government consults with 
NGOs, this consultation occurs in a “pro forma manner,” with NGO leaders’ “expert arguments 
not considered and without explanations of why they are ignored.” 242 This type of consultation is 
the functional equivalent of no consultation. 
Another NGO representative described “attempts to pressure civil society with a 
[parliamentary] proposal to call NGOs foreign agents if they are funded by foreign, non-EU 
donors in the registrar.” 243 Other activists criticize the failure of public officials to operate 
                                                
239 Spirova, “Bulgaria Nations in Transit 2016.”  
240 Spirova, “Bulgaria Nations in Transit 2016.”  
241 Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 5, 2016. 
242 A different activist interviewed in Sofia, who often works with the Ministry of Interior, highlighted that the 
Ministry “says they consult with NGOs, but they need to really open up more.” She expressed many activists’ 
complaints about the government not wanting to cooperate with NGOs and about the administration not working 
with all NGOS equally. 
Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 5, 2016. 
Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 2016. 
243 Hungarian politicians have proposed similar laws. These foreign-agent laws appear to be modeled after Russia’s 
2012 law, which classified all Russian NGOs receiving foreign funding as “foreign agents.”  
Confidential. Interview at 10 AM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 5, 2016. 
“Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups.” Human Rights Watch, March 17, 2014, sec. The Battle Chronicle. 
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transparently by providing NGOs with documents to monitor government activities and tenders. 
One activist claimed that “the administration does not keep account of its work, so it is not aware 
of its duties, what it is expected to achieve, or what the job descriptions are.” 244 By failing to 
include certain NGOs in decision-making processes and by obstructing access to information that 
activists could use for monitoring purposes, the Bulgarian government inhibits NGOs’ operation. 
A lack of funding independent of the government further complicates Bulgarian civil 
society’s work. As in the rest of the region, since Bulgaria joined the EU, many donors have 
stopped funding democracy-building NGO projects. The Bulgarian government has also slowed 
its provision of financial resources to NGOs. One interviewed activist noted that the government 
used to provide a small fund for NGOs; however, when some NGOs revealed that it was 
corrupted, the “government shut it down because that was easier than making the process 
transparent.” 245 This activist later stated, “The truth is that the state doesn’t want a strong civil 
society because it criticizes and monitors. Who would give someone money to criticize them?”246 
Another concurred with this assessment, noting that “if there are financially stable NGOs, they 
start to push the government to adopt certain policies, so the government tries to keep NGOs 
weak and from criticizing the government.” 247 Still a third Bulgarian activist argued that “the 
lack of financing means that NGOs are servants.” 248 She described the “pressure on government-
funded NGOs to exaggerate the reforms.”249 When CSOs can only reliably receive funding if 
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they speak positively about the government, they cannot perform their watchdog function. NGOs 
that receive government funding rarely criticize or monitor, while NGOs that criticize and 
monitor rarely receive funding. 
Few non-governmental sources of funding exist. Some small sources of corporate 
funding provide small grants to CSOs, such as the TELUS and VIVACOM grants.250 Some 
citizens also donate to NGOs, but USAID describes these donations as “insignificant.”251 While 
CSOs attempt to raise money from non-governmental domestic sources, they have limited 
success. The national government and international organizations continue to provide Bulgarian 
NGOs with most of their funding—and these sources of funding are decreasing. 
Even as Bulgaria has legislated and implemented some improvements for civil society, it 
has failed to either implement these policies or to create an environment where a well-resourced, 
participatory civil society can flourish. Its democracy has also stagnated since EU accession. 
While civil society was weak before Bulgaria acceded to the EU, after it acceded, civil society 
lost additional access to financial resources. The presence of a weak civil society coincides with 
democratic stagnation in Bulgaria.  
Hungary 
Before 2010, Hungary’s civil society seemed fairly consolidated. However, after Fidesz 
gained a supermajority in the legislature in 2010, the presence of a strong civil society did not 
prevent or stall anti-democratic leaders from threatening and dismantling key democratic 
institutions. Its civil society was attacked and marginalized after 2010, indicating that CSO 
strength may not be the most important factor contributing to Hungary’s democratic backsliding. 
                                                
250 In 2014, the last year that Bulgaria recorded private civil society donations, corporate donations fell by 25 
percent. 
 “The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” 68. 
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Since 2010, Hungary’s parliament has rarely consulted with NGOs while drafting 
legislation.252 One civil society activist that I interviewed in Budapest described the government 
as closed to public consultation. He noted, “many people don’t draft policy recommendations 
because no one in government is going to listen.” 253 The development of a new criminal code 
policy in 2016 illustrates this NGO leader’s sentiment. The Hungarian government established a 
website to receive feedback on the proposed criminal code legislation during the summer of 
2016. However, when I spoke to an NGO representative that same summer, this activist stated 
that his organization “does not hope to get a response because those involved do not send 
personalized responses.” 254 He described this website as a “box to tick” off of a supposedly 
democratic checklist, but far from a genuine attempt by the government to gain either 
meaningful insight or policy recommendations.” 255 The “box to tick” approach undermines the 
quality of democracy in Hungary because it marginalizes those hoping to express alternative 
political views. 
Beyond merely excluding them, politicians have also attacked Hungarian NGOs. 
Hungary’s parliament created a committee to monitor the operation of NGOs in July 2014. Prime 
Minister Orban praised this committee, stating that civil society was composed of “paid political 
activists who are trying to help foreign interests.”256 The Hungarian government has also 
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prosecuted NGO activists. In 2014, the Ökotárs Foundation’s finances were investigated after 
they were falsely accused of using Norway Grants to politically fund organizations. The 
government investigated seventeen other NGO recipients of these allegedly politicized funds. In 
June and September of 2015, the Government Control Office accused NGOs that distribute funds 
from European Economic Area-Norway Grants of “mismanagement, illegal financial activity, 
and political bias in their selection procedures.”257 All of these investigations ended without 
prosecution in October 2015. However, they disrupted and discredited these NGOs’ work.258  
All interviewed NGO activists discussed being ignored or attacked by the Hungarian 
government at least once, but more often multiple times, indicating a broad campaign to weaken 
NGOs overall, instead of just NGOs in specific fields.259 The goal of these attacks appears to be 
the delegitimization of NGOs as liberal and democratic organizations. 260  One interviewed 
activist whose internationally-recognized NGO was deemed a “foreign agent” stated, “It is the 
first level of political attack to discredit the political sphere.”261 He further asserted that the 
government “keeps mentioning foreign funding and Soros as the biggest enemies of the political 
regime, calling those associated with him evil.”262 Another activist also described the 
                                                
Additionally, some government officials have called for legislation that would require leaders of CSOs that receive 
foreign funding to disclose all of their personal assets. While this legislation has yet to pass, advocating for this type 
of reform discredits NGOs supported by foreign, democratic organizations. 
“The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” 112. 
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government’s smear campaign as labelling NGOs “leftish and pro-opposition” to “decrease their 
credibility.”263 This smear campaign has weakened NGOs by preventing them from accessing 
the government and by increasing public distrust of their work.264   
Hungarian civil society also has difficulties accessing funding. Many NGOs rely on 
funding from Hungary’s government, which is distributed “in a partisan manner.”265 Foreign 
funds have dwindled since EU accession. During an interview in Budapest, one NGO activist 
stated that after EU membership, “most international funds left the region and the big donors 
were gone because Hungary was seen as a democracy.” 266 Because so few independent sources 
of funding exist, she stated, “the government attacks funding sources like the Open Society 
Foundation and Norwegian Fund easily.”267  
By discrediting the few independent organizations that continue to contribute to 
Hungarian civil society and advocate for democratic reforms, the Hungarian government has 
effectively sidelined NGOs. Citizens increasingly accept the government’s voice as legitimate. 
One activist that I spoke to received many messages from Hungarian citizens that explicitly 
stated that her NGO was not “serving the interests of Hungarians.”268 By attacking NGOs, 
sidelining them, and keeping them under-resourced, the Hungarian government has weakened 
their collective voice. This situation likely contributes to Hungary’s democratic backsliding, or at 
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least establishes an arena that permits anti-democratic politicians to more easily undermine 
liberal democratic reforms. Though fairly strong before democracy began to backslide in 
Hungary, civil society grew weaker as anti-democratic politicians attacked and sidelined it. As 
my hypothesis suggests, the presence of a weak civil society permits a great deal of 
backtracking. After the Hungarian government sidelined NGOs, NGOs could no longer hold it 
accountable and democratic backtracking hastened.   
Romania 
The Romanian government frequently fails to implement legislation that would improve 
the functioning of civil society. One interviewed activist noted that government officials often 
ignore citizens’ concerns by refusing to “observe legislation.”269 For example, local officials 
frequently ignore the Sunshine Law, which regulates public participation in policymaking in 
order to improve transparency. An activist relayed that several years ago, “the mayor of 
Bucharest [Romania’s capital city] did not allow citizens to participate in local council meetings 
and hid decisions that were politically difficult,” which contravenes the Sunshine Law.270 CSOs 
could not resist this nontransparent practice, even though it directly violated an established law. 
The weakness of civil society appears to contribute to democratic stagnation in Romania.  
In recent years, civil society activists have turned to politics in order to improve the 
system from within.  The Save Bucharest Union—composed largely of civil society activists—
ran on an anti-corruption and transparency platform in 2016 local elections. 271 When the party 
lost, leaders transformed it into a national party, the Save Romania Union, and ran in December 
                                                
269 Confidential. Interview at 6 PM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 15, 
2016.   
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2016 parliamentary elections.272 The Save Romania Union entered parliament as the third most 
popular party.273 The decision of civil society activists to abandon government lobbying and 
monitoring in favor of making direct changes from within the system reveals the extent to which 
the Romanian government has failed to incorporate NGOs into the policy-making process. 
 Romania’s failure to implement legislation that improves civil society participation and 
engagement has weakened the ability of NGOs to monitor and critique the quality of Romanian 
democracy. Funding also remains an issue for many Romanian NGOs.274 Weaknesses in civil 
society have enabled anti-democratic Romanian politicians to stall reforms, contributing to 
democratic stagnation in Romania. However, the increasing engagement of civil society actors in 
the political process may improve the quality of Romania’s democracy in the future.  
Slovenia 
Though Slovenia has a participatory and “active” civil society, it is poorly resourced. 275  
Many CSOs face financial difficulties. The short-term implications of this situation remain 
significant. In 2014, an important media watchdog organization, the Media Watch Project, ended 
its activities because it could no longer afford to operate.276 Furthermore, many NGOs facing 
financial difficulties spend much of their time applying for grants. Frequently searching for new 
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sources of funding decreases the time that they have available to improve the quality of 
Slovenian democracy.277 One interviewed activist noted that, “For very small NGOs, it is hard to 
have the capacity to fundraise and submit to calls for proposals from international 
organizations.”278 In these difficult financial situations, NGOs often struggle to remain both 
active participants in political life and financially viable. 
Another barrier to civil society’s operation is the lack of citizens’ understanding of 
NGOs’ roles in society. Citizens frequently do not know what civil society does or why these 
organizations operate.279 One interviewed NGO leader stated that the public “believes that NGOs 
aren’t necessary because people don’t understand the system. The majority of that is because the 
politicians don’t see us as a crucial stakeholder to talk on the relevant issues.”280 This societal 
disconnect prevents many NGOs from mobilizing citizens to hold politicians accountable.281  
Politicians often fail to treat NGOs as important and equal stakeholders in Slovenian 
democracy.282 An interviewed NGO leader stated that “sometimes the government isn’t open or 
transparent about initiating public discussions.”283 He noted that government calls for public 
contributions to policies are “published on websites that are hard to find.”284 A few years ago, the 
Slovenian government required public consultation prior to implementing policy. However, one 
NGO activist stated, “When NGO watchdogs monitor the revision and its implementation, we 
see there are reforms that are taking time for capacity to be fully developed.”285 Still another 
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interviewed activist highlighted that even as their national government issues “good strategies, 
not a lot of things are done in practice” to improve the consultation process for NGOs.286 
However, a different NGO leader underscored that levels of cooperation with politicians 
vary substantially based on the involved ministries and type of project.287 She observed a 
“gradual transferring of services to NGOs” and an “overall gradual improvement in legislation 
and public consultation.”288 While the situation for Slovenian NGOs could be improved, the 
opportunities for consulting with public officials seem greater than the USAID Civil Society 
Sustainability Index would lead one to believe. The presence of NGOs as key stakeholders and 
watchdogs helps Slovenia maintain its path towards democratic deepening—though other factors 
appear more strongly related to Slovenia’s successful democratic transition. 
Popular Participation in Politics 
 Overall, Eastern Europeans do not participate much in politics. As noted in the World 
Values Survey statistical analysis, in 1995, the average person in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
and Slovenia participated in 1.09 civic activities, and in 2005, in 0.64 civic activities.289 In 
general, East Europeans view politicians warily and cynically, which contributes to these low 
levels of activism. However, when major events occur, crowds sometimes rally in order to 
protest anti-democratic changes to legislation or practices.  
This section seeks to discern the extent to which higher levels of citizens’ participation in 
political activities can impact democratic consolidation. I hypothesize that when citizens 
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participate more in political activities, democratic institutions will be less likely to backtrack. 
Even though I failed to find support for this hypothesis in my statistical model, the analysis in 
this section considers that the effect of levels of civic engagement on politicians’ behaviors in 
Eastern Europe may fundamentally differ in recent years from earlier years. While the EU 
largely influenced the democratization of the countries in 1995 and, even to some extent in 2005, 
perhaps this influence waned over time as Eastern European politicians and citizens saw their 
democracies as more developed and established.  Especially as Romania and Bulgaria joined the 
EU and the EU no longer held the carrot of accession, public opinion may have become a more 
important force driving politicians’ behavior. Another problem with my statistical model is that it 
would not have taken into consideration varying levels of professionalism in civil society 
engagement. Perhaps the overall levels of participation matter less than the ability of key civil 
society actors to shape the behavior of politicians. As a result, this section reexamines whether 
higher levels of citizens’ engagement in civic activities discourages democratic backtracking.  
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian citizens’ participation in politics remains low. For example, though Bulgarian 
municipalities are legally required to host a public meeting on the budget for the upcoming year, 
according to an interviewed NGO activist, the government fails to “provide understandable 
materials to people, so they cannot ask informed questions.” 290 Bulgarian politicians often 
discourage public discourse and block citizens from effectively engaging in political processes 
by failing to provide them with relevant, comprehensible information.291 Low levels of civic 
involvement may help explain democratic stagnation in Bulgaria.  
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Though popular participation in political activities remains low, some protests—largely 
centered around standard of living issues—occur. In 2013, hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians, 
primarily low-income citizens from rural areas, protested high electricity prices and a falling 
standard of living.292 While the protests focused on living conditions and issues with the 
privatization process, several protesters carried EU flags and railed against the political elites 
who appeared unconnected with ordinary people’s struggles. 293 The Bulgarian case offers 
support for the theory that when political participation is low but can be rallied, democratic 
institutions will be more vulnerable to stagnation. In this situation, democracy is less likely to 
consolidate because it lacks a critical and near constant check, but it is equally as unlikely to 
backtrack because popular support can be rallied against egregiously anti-democratic activities.  
Hungary  
According to Freedom House, citizen’s participation in Hungary’s democracy is limited 
to “periodic protests, demonstrations, and voting.”294 Academics András Bozóki and Eszter 
Simon describe the lack of Hungarian activism as symptomatic of a “political culture of passive 
individualism.”295 In this environment, citizens distrust democratic institutions and rarely 
participate in social movements, civil society, or other forms of political organization. Hungary’s 
low levels of citizen mobilization in the political realm enable politicians to implement anti-
democratic reforms. Its democratic institutions remain fairly vulnerable to democratic 
backsliding in the absence of citizens’ participation in democracy. 
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Romania 
Romanian citizens rarely participate in political activities besides voting.  However, in the 
wake of major corruption scandals, Romanians have protested to express their discontent. In 
2013, protests spread against environmentally hazardous projects and government corruption.296 
According to an activist, other protests occurred “when there were attempts to change the 
criminal code and anti-corruption legislation.” 297 Additionally, 5,000 Romanians rallied against 
an illegal logging bill in 2015, forcing lawmakers to omit these logging amendments from the 
legislation.298 
 About 20,000 Romanians protested in 2015 after the Collectiv nightclub fire killed over 
60 Romanians and occurred as a result of a failure to enforce safety regulations. 299  This fire 
coincided with the death of a police officer, which resulted from Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Internal Affairs Gabriel Oprea’s illegal use of a motorcade. 300 Using the slogan 
“Corruption Kills,” protestors forced Prime Minister Viktor Ponta and his cabinet to resign.301  
 Half a million Romanians participated in the largest protests since the fall of communism 
in February 2017, after parliament passed a decree that decriminalized corruption if it did not 
involve more than about $47,500.302 The emergency decree was widely viewed as a political 
maneuver to force the DNA to drop its investigation into the ruling party’s president, Liviu 
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Dragnea.303 Responding to these protests, the government withdrew the controversial decree and 
Justice Minister Florin Iodache resigned.304 However, even after withdrawing this decree, the 
Social Democratic ruling party’s parliamentarians are currently debating incorporating the 
withdrawn decree’s provisions into new legislation. The current Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu 
is keen to pass this legislation.305  Parliament is also debating a different piece of legislation, 
which could free officials imprisoned on corruption charges.306  
 Even as protests occur in large numbers and sometimes accomplish their aims, some 
Romanian civil society activists remain skeptical of their lasting impact. One interviewee argued 
that “politicians know that popular reaction is not a strong force and people forget quickly. The 
protests after the Collectiv fire lasted less than a week and then everyone went on with their 
business like nothing ever happened.” 307 However, these protests seem to suggest that the 
Romanian government is cognizant of people’s complaints and works to redress them. Even this 
low degree of citizen’s participation in politics in recent years seems to have contributed to 
democratic stagnation, as protests have protected democratic reforms from the most anti-
democratic actions that otherwise may have resulted in backtracking. 
Slovenia 
Civic involvement in Slovenia remains low; however, Slovenian students learn how to 
participate in democratic processes. Within Slovenian schools, administrators empower students 
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to “participate in multilevel school decision-making activities.”308 Participation in these student 
government organizations provides youth an opportunity to learn the importance of civic 
engagement and prepares them to engage with CSOs later in life.  
In general, most of Slovenia’s NGOs do not work on political or democratic issues, but 
instead focus on sports, culture, and art.309 Furthermore, participation in protests remains low. 
Some Slovenian NGOs protested the treatment of migrants and refugees in 2015. However, the 
government did not respond to their requests to allow migrants to move more freely.310 In 
November 2015, policemen attempted to strike for higher wages. They were unsuccessful, as the 
Slovenian government condemned the strikers and did not provide them with a pay raise.311 
Protests also occurred in 2014 after protestors expected former Prime Minister Jansa’s corruption 
trial decision to be released quickly. Many protesters thought that this trial, held before election 
day, was politically motivated and designed to discredit his Social Democratic political party.312   
Overall, however, few protests have occurred in recent years and political participation 
remains low. Few reports issued about Slovenian politics mention civil society involvement. 
Low levels of civic participation do not help explain how Slovenia has deepened its democracy.  
Trust in Political Institutions 
 Eastern Europeans generally express low levels of trust in political institutions. However, 
some states have citizens that trust the EU, even when they distrust their national government. 
Since the EU may represent liberal democracy in its supporters’ minds, I hypothesize that when 
levels of trust in the EU are higher than levels of trust in national governments, democracy will 
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be more likely to deepen. My statistical model did not find support for this hypothesis. By 
examining the Eurobarometer survey’s measures of trust in the following graphs, it is easy to see 
how volatile trust is. 313 With trust so variable, it is hard to compare the relative levels of trust in 
the EU to trust in the national government and make any meaningful conclusions.  
Graph 3.2: Relative Levels of Trust in the EU and National Government 
Source: Eurobarometer 
                                                
313 “Standard Eurobarometer 83.” European Commission, 2015. 
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Bulgaria 
Trust in the EU appears much more stable and higher than trust in the Bulgarian national 
government. Scholar Ivan Krastev describes Bulgaria as a “troubled democracy” with “very low” 
trust in domestic institutions.314 Several interviewed civil society activists confirmed these views. 
One noted, “Bulgarian politicians are more interested in what is best for their own lives. What 
they say is one thing and what they do is another.” 315 Another activist asserted that the “lack of 
trust in government and politicians is growing in Bulgarian society.”316 Bulgaria’s levels of trust 
in the EU also vary. Though trust in the EU seems higher than trust in the national government, 
the overall low levels of trust and high levels of volatility in trust do not lend themselves to 
suggesting any relationship between trust and democratic stagnation in Bulgaria. 
Hungary 
In Hungary, trust in the national government is low. The EU is consistently slightly more 
trusted. Freedom House describes the low levels of trust in national institutions and political 
parties as “raising concerns about the legitimacy of the political system.”317 Declining trust in 
national institutions appears to result from the corrupt, self-interested actions of politicians.318 
However, trust in the EU does not fare much better. Even some civil society activists fear that 
the EU worsens democratic deepening prospects in Hungary because it funds some of the Orban 
regime’s anti-democratic activities. One interviewed activist stated, “Without the EU, the 
Hungarian government couldn’t fund the Hungarian state and couldn’t pay for their political lies. 
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The EU subsidizes this political system indirectly.” 319 With even some of the most pro-liberal 
democracy activists distrusting the EU, levels of trust in the institution remain low. Due to low 
trust in both institutions, this section of my case study does not find a relationship between trust 
in the EU and national government and democratic backsliding in Hungary. 
Romania 
Trust in both Romania’s national government and the EU is fairly low. One interviewed 
Romanian NGO activist described national politicians as having “a bad public image and not 
trusted by society.” 320 Another said that the EU couldn’t “make much of a difference and 
wouldn’t get involved if there was an anti-democratic wave in Romania.” 321 Romania appears to 
have the most volatile levels of trust in the EU and in the national government—with both 
varying by 30 percentage points across time. Since levels of trust may be expressed as reflections 
of how the institution was performing at the time of the interview instead of actual levels of trust 
in the institution, I do not think that this hypothesis improves explanations of trends in levels of 
democracy in Romania. 
Slovenia 
In 2015, trust in the national government remained low—the lowest level of all OECD 
member states. 322 Furthermore, between 2007 and 2013, public trust in the government and 
politicians decreased more in Slovenia than in any other EU country.323 The July 2014 elections 
also demonstrate a distrust of political actors, as the Modern Center Party formed about one 
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month before the election and won over one-third of the vote.324 For such a new party to form 
and become so successful, trust in national political actors must have been quite low. Like 
Romania, Slovenians express levels of trust varying in 30 percentage points over time. Trust in 
the EU relative to the national government does not appear related to democratic consolidation in 
Slovenia.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined four main hypotheses to examine which aspects of political 
culture most strongly impact the extent to which democratic consolidation succeeded in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. Defining democracy in liberal ways seems to help 
explain trends in levels of democracy. However, the extent to which people are involved in civic 
activities and the strength of civil society seem to more strongly predict subsequent levels of 
democracy. Relative levels of trust in the EU and national government, by contrast, do not seem 
to matter in explanations of democratic developments in the four countries.  
Overall, civil society appears to be one of the most important political culture factors 
driving democratic deepening. The strength of civil society is closely linked to all four countries’ 
levels of success in democratization. However, political culture factors cannot be successfully 
analyzed without also contextualizing them within the leadership factors that constrain or 
facilitate the ability of political culture to become more liberal. A strong civil society will likely 
not operate effectively if it emerges in an illiberal country seeking to suppress independent 
voices. Thus I now turn to examine the leadership factors that affect democratization in the four 
case study countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF ELITE STRATEGIES ON DEMOCRATIC 
BACKTRACKING 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between institutional engineering and political culture can be best 
characterized as reciprocal. The presence of weak rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a 
political culture unsupportive of democratic values does not necessarily suggest that democratic 
backtracking will occur. However, politicians may take advantage of these structural factors by 
manipulating the system either for their own benefit or to worsen the quality of democracy in a 
country. The presence of weak rule of law and judicial institutions coupled with a political 
culture less supportive of democracy can provide opportunities for illiberal politicians to gain 
key positions of power and to implement policies that result in democratic backtracking. Without 
the presence of these strategic leaders, states with weak institutions and political cultures not 
supportive of liberal democracy will likely stagnate democratically.  
Even when strategic leaders who want to manipulate or attack their state’s democratic 
structures exist, they might not succeed without weak institutions and an illiberal political 
culture. Both of these institutional and societal factors may decrease checks on anti-liberal 
democratic leaders’ power. Stronger rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a democratic 
political culture present challenges to illiberal elites by decreasing the likelihood of them gaining 
political power and—when in power—countering anti-democratic politicians who wish to use 
their authority to implement policies that harm democratic institutions.  
I hypothesize that political elites’ actions towards democratic institutions will have a 
distinguishable effect on Eastern European democracies.325 When sustained attacks on a variety 
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of democratic pillars occur, these attacks will likely cause democratic backtracking in states with 
weak rule of law and judiciaries as well as a political culture not actively supportive of liberal 
democracy.326 States with less democratic political cultures and weak rule of law and judiciaries 
have fewer societal and institutional checks on anti-democratic leaders. As a result, when leaders 
in these states behave undemocratically, I hypothesize that the state will backtrack to a large 
degree—with democratic institutions markedly declining after leaders engage in these attacks.  
However, in states with weak rule of law and judicial institutions and a democratic 
political culture, sustained attacks on the democratic system by leaders will likely result in a 
smaller degree of democratic backsliding in comparison to states with weak institutions and an 
illiberal political culture. A similar small degree of democratic backsliding will likely occur in 
states with strong rule of law and judicial institutions, but an illiberal political culture. In these 
states with varying degrees of institutional strength and political culture liberalness, some checks 
on the leader exist—either via a political culture that values democracy or via strong rule of law 
and judicial institutions. While anti-democratic leaders will still negatively affect the quality of 
democracy, they will be less successful in undermining the democratic order when compared to 
leaders of states with a less liberal political culture and weak rule of law and judicial institutions.  
Finally, in states with democratic political cultures and strong rule of law and judicial 
institutions, when leaders mount sustained attacks on democracy, democratic stagnation will 
likely occur. Since these leaders will block reforms to improve the quality of democracy and 
since these leaders will likely be checked by other societal and institutional actors, I hypothesize 
that democratic institutions will stagnate.  
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By contrast, regardless of the strength of rule of law and judiciaries and regardless of the 
degree to which political culture supports democracy, when politicians either fail to implement 
policies or engage in short-term attempts to “rig” the political game, I predict that democratic 
stagnation will occur. Because these politicians largely manipulate the system for their own 
benefit, they are not engaged in an active effort to dismantle democracy. In this mixed 
environment with half-hearted attempts to change the democratic institutions, the overall quality 
of democracy will likely stagnate. Even if either political culture, rule of law, or judicial 
institutions are sufficiently democratic or strong enough to withstand attacks by these politicians, 
democracy is unlikely to deepen because leaders will oppose pro-democratic reforms when these 
reforms conflict with the politicians’ self-interested agendas. Regardless of societal and 
institutional factors, I hypothesize that when leaders engage in short-term attempts to rig the 
democratic system, democratic stagnation will occur.  
Some politicians do not engage in attacks on democracy. When politicians conform to 
democratic norms and refuse to attack the quality of democracy in a country, democratic 
institutions may either stagnate or improve, but will not backtrack. Even when leaders respect 
democracy, when a country has an illiberal political culture and weak rule of law and judicial 
institutions, democracy will likely stagnate. In these states, the public rarely calls for 
improvements in the quality of democracy and the rule of law and judicial institutions are 
unlikely to have the capacity to improve the functioning of democratic institutions in the country. 
By contrast, when a state has either an illiberal political culture and strong rule of law and 
judicial institutions or a liberal political culture and weak rule of law and judicial institutions, 
and when the leaders do not attack the democratic system, some degree of democratic 
consolidation will likely occur. In these states, since some societal or governmental institution 
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favors democratic consolidation and since leaders do not obstruct this path, I predict democratic 
consolidation will result. However, I hypothesize that a much greater degree of democratic 
consolidation will occur in states with both a political culture actively supportive of liberal 
democracy and strong rule of law and judicial institutions. When the leader of a state with these 
societal and institutional factors does not oppose democratic reforms, the impetus towards 
democratic reform will likely propel states to significantly consolidate their democracies. The 
interaction of these hypothesized factors and their outcomes are depicted in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Hypothesized Relationship between Elite Strategies and Political Culture, Rule of 
Law, and Judicial Institutions 
 Sustained Attacks on 
Democracy 
Short-term Attempts 
to Rig the System 
No Attacks on 
Democracy 
Illiberal Political 
Culture + Weak Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Significant Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation Stagnation 
Illiberal Political 
Culture + Strong Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political 
Culture + Weak Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political 
Culture + Strong Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Stagnation Stagnation Significant Democratic 
Consolidation 
These theories anticipating the impact of leaders’ actions on the quality of democracy 
have not been developed with the benefit of hindsight into developments in Eastern European 
politics. Some of the country cases that I use do not fit into the hypothesized categories and I do 
not have enough variation in my cases to test all of the categories described above. These 
hypotheses merely suggest a theoretical framework that could be useful for understanding the 
interaction between leadership, political culture, and rule of law and judicial institutions, as well 
as the impact of these interactions on the quality of democracy.  
Before turning to the individual case studies, I would like to return to the extent to which 
democratic backsliding, stagnation, and consolidation have occurred in the four countries 
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examined. Freedom House Nation in Transit scores range from 1, the best, to 7, the worst. 
Freedom House’s methodology states that a shift of 0.25 indicates the occurrence of minor or 
moderate developments, while a change larger than 0.5 signals significant developments in the 
quality of democracy. My coding follows this methodology. If the change in score exceeds 
positive 0.5, democratic backtracking occurs. When the change exceeds a negative 0.5, 
democratic deepening occurs. I conceive any difference under 0.5 points to be indicative of 
democratic stagnation.  However, in consolidated democracies, one would not expect a small 
change to indicate stagnation, which has inherently negative connotations. After reaching a 
certain level of democratic consolidation, it is hard to improve one’s score by over half a point. 
On Freedom House’s seven-point scale, any democracy that maintains a score below 3.0 should 
be regarded as consolidated. The graph below plots the changes over time in the Freedom House 
Nations in Transit scores for the four cases that I examine. Table 4.2 clarifies which democracies 
have stagnated, backtracked, or consolidated since their respective EU accession dates. 
Graph 4.1: Country-Level Freedom House Nations in Transit Democracy Scores 
 
Source of Data: Freedom House 
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Table 4.2: Comparing Predictions to Reality in Cases 
 Change in Levels of 
Democracy since EU 
Accession Date 
Qualitative Meaning 
of Change in Levels of 
Democracy 
Model’s Predicted Change 
Bulgaria 0.36 Stagnation Stagnation 
Hungary 1.33 Backsliding Stagnation before 2010 and a 
significant amount of backsliding 
after 2010 
Romania 0.17 Stagnation Stagnation 
Slovenia 0.18 Consolidation Significant Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
I now will place the case study countries into my theoretical framework. Bulgarian 
leaders largely failed to implement policies related to democratic deepening across the entire 
post-communist period. Instead of mounting attacks on democracy, Bulgarian politicians took 
advantage of the weak rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a political culture 
ambivalent towards democratic ideals. My model predicts that Bulgaria’s democracy would 
stagnate across the entire period.  
Before 2010, Hungary was characterized by leaders engaging in short-term attempts to 
rig the system, a weak political culture, but strong rule of law and judicial institutions. My model 
thus predicts that democratic stagnation would occur in Hungary. By contrast, after 2010, 
Hungarian politicians actively mounted sustained attacks on Hungary’s democracy. While the 
illiberal political culture trend continued, the politicians’ attacks weakened the rule of law and 
judicial institutions. Hungary thus moved positions in the model to the section that predicts a 
significant degree of democratic backtracking (see Table 4.3).   
Across the entire post-communist period, Romanian politicians have largely taken 
advantage of short-term attempts to rig the political system in their favor. Until 2015, Romania 
could be characterized by a liberal political culture with weak rule of law and judicial 
institutions. However, reforms in 2015 strengthened the rule of law and judicial institutions and 
  
 
108 
political culture remained liberal. As leaders continue to engage in short-term attempts to rig the 
political system in both eras, my model predicts democratic stagnation.  
Finally, since the beginning of the democratic transition, Slovenia has been characterized 
by a liberal political culture and strong rule of law and judicial institutions. Slovenian politicians 
do not attack democracy, but instead enforce democratic reforms. My model predicts that 
Slovenia would significantly consolidate its democracy.  
Table 4.3: Hypothesized Relationship between Elite Strategies and Political Culture, Rule of Law, and 
Judicial Institutions Applied to Cases 
 Sustained Attacks on 
Democracy 
Short-term Attempts 
to Rig the System 
No Attacks on 
Democracy 
Illiberal Political 
Culture + Weak Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Significant Democratic 
Backsliding 
Hungary since 2010 
Stagnation 
Bulgaria 
Stagnation 
Illiberal Political 
Culture + Strong Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation 
Hungary before 2010 
 
Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political 
Culture + Weak Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation 
Romania until 2013 
Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political 
Culture + Strong Rule 
of Law and Judiciary  
Stagnation Stagnation 
Romania since 2013 
Significant Democratic 
Consolidation 
Slovenia 
 
Bulgaria  
 By holding power until the 1998 elections, the communist successor party—the 
Bulgarian socialists—avoided creating democratic institutions.327 In order to focus on the 
establishment and development of democratic institutions, this section discusses the impact of 
political leadership on the quality of Bulgaria’s democracy after the 1998 elections. Since then, 
weak rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a fairly illiberal political culture exist in 
Bulgaria. However, Bulgarian politicians have not engaged in blatantly anti-democratic 
                                                
327 Bugajski, Janusz. “Bulgaria: Progress and Development.” In Central and East European Politics: From 
Communism to Democracy, edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane Leftwich Curry, 3rd ed., 341–71. London: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015. 341. 
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activities. Instead, they largely fail to implement democratizing policies. In an environment 
where political culture remains less supportive of democracy and where rule of law and judicial 
institutions remain weak, Bulgarian politicians’ decision to not implement democratic policies—
as opposed to implementing anti-democratic policies that aggressively undermine democratic 
institutions—helps explain why democracy has stagnated instead of backtracked. 
 While some effort to establish democratic institutions existed before EU accession, the 
policies pursued by Bulgarian politicians did not establish consolidated institutions. Bulgarian 
leaders used work strategies and agendas to demonstrate a superficial commitment to democratic 
reforms and to avoid making meaningful changes.328 Failing to take a proactive and pro-
democratic approach, Bulgarian politicians did not reform until they were “sanctioned by the 
market” or by EU conditionality.329 Even the political party that placed Bulgaria on the path to 
establishing democratic institutions failed to champion for reforms beyond the “bare minimum” 
required for EU accession. 330  
 One interviewed Bulgarian activist argued that “our politicians don’t care” about 
democracy. 331 Bulgarian politicians do not seek to improve the quality of democracy, but instead 
                                                
328 Racovita, “Europeanization and Effective Democracy,” 41-42. 
329 Noutcheva and Bechev, “The Successful Laggards,” 119-120. 
330 Bulgarian leaders’ approach to prosecuting corruption is emblematic of their pursuit of short-term attempts to rig 
the political system in their favor. Before EU accession, the EU tied Bulgaria’s membership to decreasing and 
punishing high-level corruption across all sectors of governance. Between 2005 and 2009, Bulgarian politicians 
ignored instances of high-level political corruption. Instead, they focused on corruption occurring in the judicial and 
police sectors. The decision to only punish corruption in certain sectors reveals that Bulgarian politicians merely 
implemented the policies that were required for EU membership, as opposed to pursing reforms that would establish 
a functioning liberal democracy. Even after the EU froze funds in 2008 and the government enacted some of the 
required institutional reforms, significant changes or reforms still did not occur. The government continued to pass 
the legislation needed to receive EU funding, but not more than was required.  
Dawson, James, and Séan Hanley. “The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus.’” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 
(January 2016): 20–34. 
Spendzharova, Aneta. “Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU 
Accession.” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (December 9, 2011): 39–58. 
331 Confidential. Interview at 7:30 PM with a Bulgarian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, July 11, 
2016. 
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prefer to ignore legislation for their own benefit. During one of my interviews in Bucharest, a 
Romanian NGO activist compared the leadership situation in Bulgaria and Romania. She stated, 
“In Bulgaria, personal goals are more dominant than in Romania. The executive and legislative 
[branches] do a lot of things to not reform the state and to interfere with the justice system.”332 
This characterization of the Bulgarian leadership indicates a desire of Bulgarian politicians to 
improve their personal positions, sometimes at the expense of democracy. In areas where it is 
convenient or necessary for them to behave democratically, they will. However, when they can 
personally benefit by failing to implement democratic legislation or by profiting from the system 
in some way, they often choose this course of action.333  
 One interviewed Bulgarian activist noted that politicians “sometimes try to take a step 
backward” in the quality of democracy; however, many “try to keep the status quo.”334 
Politicians benefit from this status quo and continue to rig the political system to improve their 
personal positions. This activist further argued, “they [politicians] are in power today, so they try 
to get as much profit today as possible and to stay in [governance] after that.”335  
The less liberal democratic political culture and weak rule of law and judicial institutions 
enable Bulgarian politicians to pursue policies that benefit themselves. These politicians’ 
decision to profit from the democratic system instead of improving or attacking it helps explain 
why Bulgaria’s democracy has stagnated. With a focus on rigging the system for the leaders’ 
                                                
332 Confidential. Interview at 11 AM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, June 
26, 2016.  
333 Ganev, “Post-Accession Hooliganism.” 
334 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 
2016. 
335 Confidential. Interview at 1:30 PM in Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, July 4, 
2016. 
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benefit, democracy has stagnated at a poor and unconsolidated level—with few incentives for 
politicians to improve it. 
Hungary 
 Hungarian politicians behaved differently before and after 2010, which helps explain 
changes in levels of democracy. Before 2010, Hungarian politicians largely sought to establish 
functioning democratic institutions. While political culture did not actively support democratic 
values, the established rule of law and judicial institutions were fairly strong. However, after 
2010, Fidesz politicians used constitutional procedures to undermine the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary. Coupled with a less democratic political culture, Hungarians after 
2010 struggled to slow or stop the backtracking of democracy.  
 During Hungary’s initial democratic transition, it was seen as a “front-runner” in 
establishing liberal democracy and a capitalist economic system.336 Politicians respected the 
constitutional framework, which encouraged the formation of a stable democratic system and the 
continuation of fair party competition.337 One NGO activist whom I interviewed noted that: 
 In the 1990s, the executive and judiciary clashed, but the government didn’t rewrite 
legislation because there was a principle that democracy is debating and that this debate 
is necessary. In 2004 and 2005, the prosecution service and government clashed because 
the government wanted a criminal conduct code and the prosecution service said no. The 
government could have rewritten the legislation and gotten rid of the prosecutor at that 
time, but they chose not to change the rules after the game was written.338 
 
While leaders in institutions frequently had competing aims and disagreed on policy, they 
respected the institutional configuration that had been engineered to promote democracy. In early 
                                                
336 Millard, Frances. “The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.” In Developments in Central and East European 
Politics, edited by Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis, 4th ed. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 2007. 37. 
337 Millard, “The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,” 49. 
338 Confidential. Interview at 2:30 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 
2, 2016. 
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2010, scholars Andras Bozoki and Eszter Simon published an article describing Hungary as a 
consolidated democracy.339 Some governance problems existed before 2010; however, leaders 
generally abided by democratic norms and democratic stagnation occurred. To better understand 
why these initial successes ultimately were undermined requires a look at the decisions made by 
Fidesz politicians since 2010.  
 After Fidesz won a supermajority of legislative seats, Prime Minister Viktor Orban 
undermined many of the rule of law and judicial institutions that other leaders previously 
respected.340 Fidesz politicians have taken advantage of the less democratic political culture and 
the weak rule of law and judicial institutions to pass anti-democratic policies. Scholars Péter 
Krekó and Gregor Mayer describe Viktor Orban as attempting to “transform” democratic 
institutions to strengthen the right and “eliminate” the left in order to create a “consolidated 
system” under his rule.341 One NGO activist concurred, stating that her organization expanded to 
work in new policy areas in response to Fidesz gaining power in 2010 “because the government 
wants to destroy constitutional democracy.” 342 She further asserted that “whatever was very 
important for the government, they could achieve it.” 343 No one outside of the Fidesz 
government could protect democratic institutions, according to this interviewed activist.344  
                                                
339 An interviewed NGO activist reiterated this sentiment, noting that “checks and balances were an idea of the pre-
EU accession period and were achieved” until the 2010 election of Fidesz. 
Bozoki and Simon, “Hungary since 1989,” 226. 
Confidential. Interview at 2:30 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 2, 
2016. 
340 Fidesz gained a supermajority in 2010 largely because of the corruption associated with the incumbent Social 
Democratic party. A protest vote against the Social Democrats’ corruption, as opposed to a widespread mandate 
from Hungarian citizens, explains why Fidesz swept the election.  
Toka, “Constitutional Principles and Electoral Democracy in Hungary,” 14. 
341 Krekó and Mayer, “Transforming Hungary—together?” 201. 
342 Confidential. Interview at 1 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 1, 
2016. 
343 Confidential. Interview at 1 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 1, 
2016.  
344 Confidential. Interview at 1 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 1, 
2016.  
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The lack of a political alternative to Fidesz appears to largely drive the decision of 
Hungarians to avoid protesting.345 The only other organized party in Hungary is the neo-fascist 
Jobbik party.346 In this environment, with many attacks on democratic institutions and without 
either enough popular support to defend democracy or a legitimate, mainstream political 
alternative, Fidesz politicians can engage in anti-democratic activities without constraints.347 
 Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his party’s politicians have sustained their systematic 
attacks on democracy. In 2014, Orban actively attacked the notion of liberal democracy in a 
speech, arguing that a democracy does not have to be “liberal.”348 Instead, Orban advocated for a 
“break” from liberal conceptions of democracy. 349  Clearly attacking the presence of and 
principles undergirding Hungary’s democratic system, Orban stated that liberal democracy failed 
                                                
Hungarians lack a legitimate political alternative to Fidesz. The center-left is disorganized and fragmented, partly 
due to its prior engagement in corruption, while Fidesz is the only organized party on the right. The only other 
coherent Hungarian political party is the far-right Jobbik party. As a result, Fidesz politicians do not fear electoral 
punishment when they behave in undemocratic ways. Despite low levels of support for Fidesz—a public opinion 
poll conducted in February 2016 placed support for Fidesz at 32 percent—, no other challenger has gained 
legitimacy. As a result, Orban is empowered to enact the anti-democratic policies that he favors. By contrast, in 
Bulgaria, many political parties compete for office. Coalition government is the norm. Frequently, the third-largest 
Bulgarian political party—the ethnic Turkish party--Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) finds itself in a 
kingmaker role. Bulgarian coalition governments moderate politicians’ expressed attitudes towards democracy 
through political competition, which does not exist in Hungary.  
Kutlay, Muzaffer. “Minority Politics in Bulgaria: An Assessment of Movement for Rights and Freedom.” USAK 
Yearbook 6 (2013): 249–52. 
Than, Krisztina. “Public Support for Hungarian PM’s Party Drops in February: Poll.” Reuters, March 2, 2016, sec. 
World News. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-support-idUSKCN0W420Z. 
345 In 2014, thousands of Hungarians protested a proposed internet tax. However, these protests only occurred in 
Budapest and were delegitimized by pro-government media sources as a movement led by the cosmopolitan elite. 
Furthermore, these protests did not actually threaten Orban or his policies because no other mainstream political 
party has either the strength or the cohesion to challenge Fidesz. The lack of political alternatives discourages most 
protests in Hungary. 
Traynor, Ian. “Budapest Autumn: Hollowing out Democracy on the Edge of Europe.” The Guardian. October 29, 
2014, sec. Europe. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/29/budapest-viktor-orban-democracy-edge-
hungary. 
346 Traynor, “Budapest Autumn.” 
347 See the previous chapters for discussions of the ways in which Fidesz has dismantled liberal democracy as well 
as the extent to which political culture is anti-democratic. 
348 Orban, Viktor. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and 
Student Camp.” Speech, Bāile Tusnad, Romania, July 26, 2014. http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-
prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-
and-student-camp. 
349 Orban, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos.” 
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to “serv[e] the interests of the nation.” 350  He then lauded Fidesz’s work to “construct…an 
illiberal state.”351 While previously some politicians may have taken advantage of their political 
power to benefit, most high-level leaders would not deploy this type of anti-liberal democratic 
rhetoric. A fundamental shift seems to have occurred in 2010—one that empowered Orban to 
restructure a previously liberal democracy into an increasingly illiberal one. 
 One interviewed Hungarian NGO leader argued that Orban and Fidesz “are sacrificing 
the past democratic achievements to be unchangeable.” 352 Journalist Paul Lendvai describes 
Orban as a “ruthless power politician who believes not in ideas, but in maximizing his power.”353 
The impact of Fidesz and Orban’s opportunistic and power-hungry behavior on democracy in 
Hungary appears to fit my hypothesis. The less liberal political culture and increasingly 
marginalized rule of law and judicial institutions found in Hungary established space for a leader 
seeking to undermine the democratic system.354 By continuing to oppose measures to liberalize 
political culture and by actively attacking democratic institutions, Orban has eroded the quality 
of democracy in Hungary. Illiberal political culture and weak institutions failed to prevent an 
anti-democratic leader from gaining power and enabled him to mount sustained attacks on 
democracy, resulting in democratic backtracking. 
                                                
350 “Orban, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos.” 
351 “Orban, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos.” 
352 Confidential. Interview at 2:30 PM in Budapest, Hungary. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, August 
2, 2016. 
353 Lendvai, Paul. Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism. Translated by Keith Chester. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012. 230. 
354 It can be argued that the ease with which Orban marginalized rule of law and judicial institutions suggests that 
these institutions may not have been strong prior to 2010. The ability of parliament to change the constitution does 
indicate that horizontal accountability and institutions were vulnerable. However, before 2010, Hungarian politicians 
obeyed democratic norms and followed the rules of the democratic order that they created. Rule of law and judicial 
institutions received enough resources and respect to be considered strong, as shown by World Bank and Freedom 
House indicators. I argue that the potential vulnerability of the rule of law and judicial institutions prior to 2010 does 
not mean that they were necessarily weak during this time period. When they were respected, they were strong. 
However, they were consistently vulnerable to anti-democratic politicians, which became increasingly clear after the 
2010 elections.  
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Romania  
 Romania’s political culture has remained fairly liberal throughout the democratic 
transition. However, its rule of law and judiciary only became strong in 2015. While some 
reforms have increased the effectiveness of these institutions and while Romanians are 
increasingly willing to protest government actions, these changes have not significantly impacted 
the overall levels of democracy in Romania. In general, Romanian politicians implement policies 
for personal gain. However, in recent years, stronger rule of law and judicial institutions as well 
as a more active political culture supportive of liberal democracy constrain Romanian 
politicians’ actions, preventing democratic backsliding and maintaining democratic stagnation.   
 Early in Romania’s democratic transition, politicians did not prioritize the creation of 
consolidated democratic institutions because many were closely tied to the former communist 
regime.355  Romanian politicians did not reform their institutions until they faced EU sanctions.356 
Democracy-building slowed when President Ion Iliescu governed from 1990 to 1996 and from 
2000 to 2004, alongside Prime Minister Adrain Nastase.357 While some progress in establishing 
democratic institutions occurred, this “progress” merely allowed Romania to continue to dither 
along the path to EU accession, as Romanian politicians completed the absolute minimum 
required of them to remain eligible for EU membership.358 
                                                
355 Some past members of Romania’s secret services gained key positions of power. The continuation of a 
willingness to use force towards government critics in the initial transition exemplifies the slow nature of Romania 
turn towards democracy. Scholar Venelin Ganev has described Romanian politicians in the pre-accession period as 
“residually motivated” to establish and strengthen political institutions in order to become EU members. 
Noutcheva and Bechev, “The Successful Laggards,” 120. 
Brett, “Romania: Old Problems and New Challenges,” 384. 
Ganev, “Post Accession Hooliganism.” 
356 Noutcheva and Bechev: “The Successful Laggards,” 119-120. 
357 Brett, “Romania: Old Problems and New Challenges,” 386. 
358 Iliescu and Nastase took advantage of the weak rule of law and judicial institutions in an attempt to create a 
political system where their PSD party could rule without challenge. By extending the constitutional term limits of 
some high-level political positions, Iliescu and Nastase worsened the quality of democracy in Romania. 
Brett, “Romania: Old Problems and New Challenges,” 386. 
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Despite not working particularly effectively, the pressure of EU conditionality did force 
these Romanian politicians to pass some reforms. The EU criticized the actions of Iliescu and 
Nastase and threatened to further slow the EU accession process. 359 Since Romanians largely 
favored joining the EU, a fairly liberal political culture supportive of both democratic reforms 
and EU accession coupled with the conditionality of the EU helped limit the anti-democratic 
actions taken by Romanian politicians.   
Instead of actively working to better their democratic system, Romanian politicians 
largely engaged in “a flurry of institutional creation.” 360  This institutional creation established 
various institutions with overlapping duties and mandates and created a significant amount of 
confusion in governance.  Overlapping responsibilities weakened rule of law and judicial 
institutions because these institutions faced difficulties coordinating their actions. As a result, 
Romanian politicians continued to engage in corrupt activities with impunity. Scholar Lavinia 
Stan describes Prime Minister Nastase as viewing “public resources as his own private assets.”361 
In 2007, Minister of Justice Teodor Chiuariu himself was investigated on corruption charges. 
When the cabinet official tasked with ensuring the prosecution of corruption is investigated for 
corruption, it is clear that the system is failing and that leaders are plundering it with impunity.  
After Romania became a member of the EU in 2007, efforts to further strengthen the 
quality of rule of law and judicial institutions as well as to liberalize political culture largely 
halted. Leaders continue to primarily concern themselves with “putting on a convincing show” of 
consolidating democracy, as opposed to actually improving the system.362  One interviewed 
Romanian NGO leader worried about “legislative proposals from all parties that decrease the 
                                                
359 Brett, “Romania: Old Problems and New Challenges,” 386-387. 
360 Racovita, “Europeanization and Effective Democracy,” 40-41. 
361 Stan, “Romania: in the shadow of the past,” 390. 
362 Davidescu et al., “Romania Nations in Transit 2016.”  
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role of the justice system in the democratic process.” 363 She expressed concern that these 
proposals would worsen the quality of democracy in Romania.  
Interestingly, Romanian political culture is increasingly actively supportive of liberal 
democracy, which may constrain leaders from acting in opportunistic or anti-democratic ways in 
the future. Protests spread throughout Romania after the government issued an emergency decree 
that decriminalized public corruption if the damage was less than 200,000 lei (about $48,000) in 
February 2017. 364 This decree would have permitted the ruling party’s leader to be acquitted of 
his corruption charges. Even after protestors forced the government to withdraw the decree, 
protests continued for several more days. 365 Ultimately, the politicians who issued this decree 
were forced to undo their actions because of political culture’s influence.  
Protest has become “routinized” to some degree in Romania, with citizens increasingly 
turning to protest to achieve political aims, realizing that it has worked fairly well in recent 
years.366 From bringing down the government after it was revealed that corruption caused the 
death of Romanians in the Collectiv fire to forcing the resignation of the Health Minister after a 
journalist revealed that the government-contracted pharmaceutical company had diluted the 
disinfectants that it provided to state hospitals over the course of 10 years, Romanians have held 
                                                
363 She noted, that these anti-democratic measures “are often taken for personal gain—like modifying the conflict of 
interest law to legally hire family members or by using corruption to finance a campaign more easily.” 
Confidential. Interview at 11 AM in Bucharest, Romania. Interview by Courtney Blackington. In-person, June 26, 
2016. 
364 “The Latest: Romania Protests Continue for 9th Night in Snow.” The Washington Post. February 8, 2017. 
Roberts, Elizabeth, and Cosmin Stan. “Romania Protests Continue over Plans to Revive Corruption Bill.” CNN, 
February 7, 2017, sec. Europe. http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/06/europe/romania-protests-update/. 
365 “The Latest: Romania Protests Continue for 9th Night in Snow.” 
Roberts and Stan. “Romania Protests Continue over Plans to Revive Corruption Bill.”  
“Hands off Their DNA: Huge Protests Force Romania’s Government to Reverse Itself on Corruption.” The 
Economist. February 11, 2017, sec. Europe. http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21716570-decree-would-
pardon-crooked-officials-dropped. 
366 Stan, Marius, and Vladimir Tismaneanu. “10 Days That Shook Romania.” Politico. February 10, 2017, sec. 
Letters from Bucharest. http://www.politico.eu/article/10-days-that-shook-romania-protests-revolution-corruption-
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their politicians accountable by engaging in mass protests. Scholar Thomas Remington describes 
Russians as falling into a “low-level equilibrium trap,” whereby Russians expect little of their 
government and the government performs as poorly as expected.367 As a result, Remington 
argues, Russians demand little of their government and their politicians respond to this by 
continuing to not supply good governance. 368  The opposite of Remington’s low-level 
equilibrium trap seems to occur in Romania. Romanians appear cognizant of the impact of their 
protests on their government’s actions. By demanding their politicians behave democratically, 
Romanians hold their politicians accountable—in a high-level equilibrium trap. 
In Romania, an increasingly democratic political culture and increasingly strong rule of 
law and judicial institutions counterbalance politicians who attempt to behave in anti-democratic 
ways. While Romanian politicians took advantage of weak rule of law and judicial institutions in 
the democratic transition, in recent years, the strengthening of rule of law and judicial institutions 
as well as a democratic political culture have enabled Romanians to hold their politicians 
accountable. However, they remain unable to force their politicians to improve the quality of 
democracy, which helps explain democratic stagnation in Romania.  
Slovenia 
 Slovenia established strong rule of law and judicial institutions as well as a political 
culture supportive of democracy early in the democratic transition. Slovenian politicians 
typically behave in accordance with liberal, democratic norms. Elected politicians rarely redirect 
the state’s resources to improve their campaigns or to support their political parties. Scholar 
                                                
367 Remington, Thomas F. Politics in Russia. 7th ed. Boston: Pearson Longman, 2012. 106. 
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Danica Fink-Hafner described Slovenia as a “textbook example” of how leading politicians 
should behave in order to establish a functioning democracy. 369  
 When discussing political developments in Slovenia with the NGO activists that I 
interviewed, I asked if Slovenian politicians attempted to either undermine democratic 
institutions or benefit from the democratic system. One asserted that, “in terms of government 
pressure against democracy, Slovenia is not having those issues.”370 He stated that politicians 
often bargain to place party loyalists into judicial positions, which he worried could decrease the 
independence of the judiciary. However, many consolidated democracies place those with 
similar ideological predispositions in the judiciary, so this should not raise concerns about the 
legitimacy of Slovenia’s judicial institutions.371 The interviewed NGO activist also noted that 
corruption “is a problem, but is not a big enough issue to undermine how the government is 
operating.”372 Another interviewed NGO leader concurred with this assessment, stating that anti-
democratic rhetoric in Slovenia largely comes from far-right parties. This activist acknowledged 
that “if these right-wing groups had a majority in the government, then that [the political 
undermining of democratic institutions] would probably be a problem.”373 Civil society activists’ 
testimony further suggests that Slovenian politicians have largely abided by democratic norms 
and refused to engage in anti-democratic activities. 
One possible explanation of the decision of Slovenian politicians to respect democratic 
norms is that Slovenian citizens may hold their politicians more accountable than citizens in 
                                                
369 Danica Fink-Hafner, “Slovenia since 1989,” 238. 
370 Confidential. Interview at 8 AM with a Slovenian NGO. Skype, January 26, 2017. 
371 For example, when Republicans in the U.S. Senate refused to confirm President Barrack Obama’s nominee for 
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372 Confidential. Interview at 8 AM with a Slovenian NGO. Skype, January 26, 2017. 
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other Eastern European countries. However, scholar Peter Rozic uses survey data from Slovenian 
citizens to suggest that Slovenians are not more likely to either engage in civic action or hold 
their leaders accountable when compared to citizens of other Eastern European states.374  
An alternative explanation suggests that since civil society is more highly respected in 
Slovenia than in other Eastern European countries, Slovenians are more likely view NGOs’ 
reports credibly. This situation may encourage politicians to behave in accordance with 
democratic norms and values. One interviewed NGO activist contended that “because civil 
society has a relatively strong public image, it is becoming a very notable voice. Through public 
image, [NGOs] have been able to influence decision-makers.”375 Coupled with strong rule of law 
and judicial institutions as well as a liberal political culture, acceptance of NGOs’ role in the 
political landscape discourages Slovenian politicians from engaging in anti-democratic practices.  
 The testimony of civil society activists via interviews and international reports suggest 
that Slovenian politicians act within democratic constraints. Each interviewed NGO activist 
highlighted that Slovenian politicians neither attacked democratic institutions nor actively 
avoided implementing liberal democratic provisions.  While some Slovenian politicians engage 
in corrupt activities, they have not yet undermined democratic institutions. It seems that no arena 
exists for anti-democrats to gain political power or strength in Slovenia, as the democratic 
political culture and strong rule of law and judicial institutions counteract these types of policies 
and encourage democratic consolidation, which has occurred. 
 
 
                                                
374 Rožič, “Have Our Dreams Come True?” 9. 
375 Confidential. Interview at 12 PM with a Slovenian NGO. Interview by Courtney Blackington. Skype, March 14, 
2017. 
 
  
 
121 
Chapter Conclusion  
Overall, my theoretical framework appears useful in analyzing the relationship between 
leaders’ actions, political culture, rule of law, judicial institutions, and trends in the quality of 
democracy in all four case studies. In Hungary, an illiberal political culture, but strong rule of 
law and judicial institutions, coupled with leaders’ short-term attempts to rig the political system 
resulted in democratic stagnation before 2010. By contrast, after 2010 and the sustained attacks 
on democracy mounted by Hungarian politicians under the Fidesz government, the rule of law 
and judicial institutions were weakened. Increasingly weak rule of law and judicial institutions 
alongside an illiberal political culture enabled anti-democratic leaders to mount frequent attacks 
on democracy, which facilitated democratic backsliding in Hungary.  
Since the beginning of the democratic transition in Bulgaria, it has had an illiberal 
political culture and weak rule of law and judicial institutions. Bulgarian politicians largely 
attempt to rig the democratic system for their own benefit. Collectively, these features of 
Bulgarian politics help explain stagnation in Bulgaria’s democratic institutions. Romania’s 
democratic developments can be largely broken into two phases: pre and post-2015. In both 
phases, Romania had a liberal political culture. Only after 2015, however, did Romania have 
strong rule of law and judicial institutions. Short-term attempts to rig Romania’s democratic 
institutions are found in both time periods, helping to account for democratic stagnation, despite 
an improvement in the quality of rule of law and judicial institutions. Finally, Slovenia has 
consolidated its democracy, largely due to a combination of a liberal political culture, strong rule 
of law and judicial institutions, and the presence of leaders who do not attack the democratic 
system. Table 4.5 reiterates the relationship between my theoretical framework and the cases. 
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Table 4.5: Summary of Hypothesized Relationship and Cases 
 Sustained Attacks on 
Democracy 
Short-term Attempts to 
Rig the System 
No Attacks on 
Democracy 
Illiberal Political Culture + 
Weak Rule of Law and 
Judicial Institutions 
Significant Democratic 
Backsliding 
Hungary since 2010 
Stagnation 
Bulgaria 
Stagnation 
Illiberal Political Culture + 
Strong Rule of Law and 
Judicial Institutions 
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation 
Hungary before 2010 
 
Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political Culture + 
Weak Rule of Law and 
Judicial Institutions  
Some Democratic 
Backsliding 
Stagnation 
Romania until 2015 
Some Democratic 
Consolidation 
Liberal Political Culture + 
Strong Rule of Law and 
Judicial Institutions  
Stagnation Stagnation 
Romania since 2015 
Significant 
Democratic 
Consolidation 
Slovenia 
 
 
 In Table 4.5, I have bolded the outcomes for which I do not have data. The obvious 
limitation of this analysis is that there simply is not enough variation in these four cases to fully 
analyze the legitimacy of this theoretical framework. However, due to its applicability to the 
cases examined in this thesis, I believe that this theoretical framework is worth applying to 
additional cases in future research to further test and perhaps refine it.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
The current literature on changes in the overall levels of democracy in Eastern European 
countries does not examine the interaction between institutional engineering, political culture, 
and leadership. Instead, scholars typically emphasize one or two of these factors in their 
explanations of changes in the quality of democracy over time. However, I find that explanations 
of democratic developments that do not connect these three factors fail to offer a complete 
picture of the phenomenon. My thesis has sought to fill this gap in the literature so as to increase 
understandings of the societal, institutional, and leadership factors that interact to correspond to 
democratic deepening, stagnation, or backtracking in Eastern Europe.  
Examining the strength of rule of law and judicial institutions at the time of a country’s 
EU accession predicted subsequent developments in levels of democracy in Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Slovenia—but not Hungary. An initially weak rule of law and judiciary in Bulgaria is 
consistent with democratic stagnation. The initially weak rule of law and judiciary in Romania 
dovetails with democratic stagnation, despite the recent strengthening of rule of law. An initially 
strong rule of law and judiciary in Slovenia corresponds to democratic consolidation. In 
Hungary, strong rule of law and judicial institutions at the time of EU accession did not 
correspond to democratic deepening. Subsequent actions taken by leaders seem more important 
in Hungary than the initial strength of rule of law and the judiciary when explaining democratic 
backsliding.  
These findings on the importance of institutional engineering suggest that other aspects of 
institution design may matter more than the strength of rule of law and the judiciary at the time 
of EU accession. Perhaps other elements of institutional design, such as the ease of changing 
legislative rules, the electoral system, and the constitution, better predict democratic 
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developments in Eastern Europe. Future research could examine the impact of alternative aspects 
of institutional design at the time of EU accession on subsequent democratization levels.  
This thesis also examined the importance of political culture on democratization trends. 
The output associated with my quantitative model sometimes differed from my qualitative 
research. Due to the weaknesses of the quantitative model, namely the poor timing of the World 
Values Survey and the inability to directly examine the relationship between respondents’ 
measures of political culture and democratic backsliding, I believe that when the findings differ, 
the qualitative research better explains democratic developments.  
When citizens understand democracy in liberal terms, democracy appears more likely to 
deepen. Of my cases, only Slovenia effectively implemented civic education policies and 
Slovenia had the only democracy that consolidated. By contrast, Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania all failed to provide effective civic education to citizens. Bulgaria and Romania’s 
democracy stagnated, while Hungary’s democracy backtracked. The lack of civic education 
inhibited many citizens of these three countries from understanding democracy in liberal terms, 
which seems to have decreased the likelihood of them advocating for liberal, democratic 
reforms. 
Civic participation seems to explain democratic stagnation better than backtracking or 
consolidation. In states where citizens protest anti-democratic actions, the democracy is more 
likely to stagnate than backtrack. However, when citizens do not protest, their democracy is 
more vulnerable to backsliding. Additionally, the presence of a strong and well-resourced civil 
society does decrease the likelihood of backtracking and increase the likelihood of democratic 
consolidation or stagnation.  
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Strong, well-resourced civil society has checked the Romanian government in recent 
years—helping to prevent democratic backtracking in Romania. However, weak and under-
resourced civil society in Bulgaria and Hungary has facilitated democratic stagnation in Bulgaria 
and backtracking in Hungary. Bulgarian and Hungarian citizens rarely push their governments to 
implement liberal, democratic reforms. In Slovenia, civil society appears fairly well-resourced 
and somewhat strong. However, other factors appear to better explain why Slovenia’s democracy 
has consolidated.  
Finally, citizens’ relative levels of trust in the EU and national government do not seem 
to impact the likelihood of democratic consolidation. Neither in the statistical model nor in the 
qualitative analysis did I find support for the hypothesis that when a state’s citizens trust the EU 
more than their national government, the democracy is more likely to consolidate. 
By examining institutional engineering, political culture, and leadership factors 
independently and together, I find that the model most predictive of democratization trends 
combines all three of these factors. Even when institutional engineering and political culture 
remain at fairly constant levels for significant periods of time, the actions of leaders can change 
the quality of democracy in a country. For example, until 2010, Hungary largely maintained the 
strength of its rule of law and judicial institutions and had a less liberal democratic political 
culture. During this period, Hungarian politicians engaged in short-term attempts to rig the 
democratic system and Hungary’s democracy stagnated. After Fidesz came to power in the 2010 
elections, politicians began to engage in sustained attacks on democracy, which weakened the 
rule of law and judicial institutions as well as marginalized civil society and independent media 
sources. In this new environment, democratic backsliding occurred.  
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However, my model suggests that leadership actions alone cannot explain democratic 
backtracking. Since EU accession, Romania has had a liberal political culture. Politicians have 
consistently engaged in short-term attempts to rig the democratic system in the post-accession 
era. In 2013, however, Romania’s rule of law institutions strengthened from their initial weak 
level. Though Romania’s democracy has continued to stagnate, its liberal political culture 
empowers Romanian protesters to defend their democracy against backsliding, even if they 
cannot deepen their democracy without the help of their politicians. Strong rule of law and 
judicial institutions as well as a liberal political culture protect Romania’s democracy from 
backsliding. Preserving democratic stagnation and defending against backtracking occurred in 
2017, when illiberal politicians attempted to push through a legislative decree that would have 
decreased penalties for corruption had Romanian protesters not forced politicians to withdraw it.  
Romania’s situation contrasts greatly from Bulgaria, which has weak rule of law and 
judicial institutions as well as an illiberal political culture. Politicians’ decisions to engage in 
short-term attempts to rig the system, instead of mount sustained attacks on democracy, protects 
Bulgaria’s democracy from backtracking. Stagnation occurs because of weak institutional and 
illiberal political cultural factors combined with politicians’ decisions. By contrast, in Slovenia, 
strong rule of law and judicial institutions, a liberal political culture, and leaders who do not 
attack the quality of democracy contribute to democratic consolidation.  
Future research could expand upon this theoretical framework by adding additional 
country case studies. As I noted in the elite strategies chapter, gaps in the model could be filled 
by analyzing other post-communist countries that have acceded to the EU. By incorporating 
more cases, the external validity of this model could tested. I believe that this theoretical 
framework is worth applying to additional cases in future research to further test and refine it.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Coding of Variables Used in Table # (World Values Survey 1995 and 2005) 
Satisfaction with democracy Views towards a democratic political system as a way 
of governing this country: 1 = very bad; 2 = fairly bad; 
3 = fairly good; 4 = very good 
Liberal definitions of democracy An index consisting of two measures measuring which 
two of the items were most important for the 
respondent with the options maintaining order in the 
nation and fighting rising prices receiving a score of 0, 
while the options giving people more say in important 
government decisions and protecting freedom of 
speech each received 1 point 
Civic Engagement An index with one point given to a respondent per 
organizational or civic involvement, including: 
membership in a religious organization, trade union, 
political party, environmental organization, 
professional association, charity organization, or an 
art, music, or education organization as well as 
participation in a petition, boycott, or demonstration.  
Relative trust in the EU versus 
national government 
Confidence in the EU and national government: 4 = a 
great deal; 3 = quite a lot; 2 = not very much; 1 = not 
at all. 
To obtain the respondent’s final value, the trust in the 
national government score was subtracted from the  
trust in the EU score. 
Education  1 = no formal education; 2 = primary school; 3 = 
secondary school; 4 = some university; 5 = university 
degree. 
Economic class 1 = lower class; 2 = working class; 3 = lower middle 
class; 4 = upper middle class; 5 = upper class. 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Quantitative Model  
  
   1995 2005 
Change in 
Level of 
Democracy 
  Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N  
Region      3,322   2,556  
 Satisfaction with democracy 1 4 2.05 1.11  2.42 0.77   
 Liberal definitions of democracy 0 2 1 0.5  1.34 0.65   
 Civic engagement 0 10 1.1 1.41  0.62 1.17   
 Relative trust in EU versus national government -2 2 0.02 0.82  0.14 0.59   
 Education 1 5 3.05 0.92  2.41 0.93   
 Economic Class 1 5 2.67 0.87  3.06 0.91   
Bulgaria      802   648 0.36 
 Satisfaction with democracy 1 4 2.3 1.1  2.56 0.83   
 Liberal definitions of democracy 0 2 0.99 0.5  1.5 0.59   
 Civic engagement 0 10 0.54 1  0.64 1.19   
 Relative trust in EU versus national government -2 2 0 -0.88  0.16 0.67   
 Education 1 5 3 0.97  3.19 1.02   
 Economic Class 1 5 2.5 0.87  2.24 0.84   
Hungary      571   533 1.33 
 Satisfaction with democracy 1 4 2.02 1.09  2.31 0.64   
 Liberal definitions of democracy 0 2 1.06 0.42  1.53 0.58   
 Civic engagement 0 7 1.01 1.25  0.3 0.66   
 Relative trust in EU versus national government -2 2 0.07 0.911  0.12 0.52   
 Education 2 5 3.02 0.099  3.06 0.82   
 Economic Class 1 5 2.61 0.77  2.53 0.79   
Romania      1,062   849 0.17 
 Satisfaction with democracy 1 4 1.71 1.05  2.38 0.8   
 Liberal definitions of democracy 0 2 0.97 0.51  1.36 0.67   
 Civic engagement 0 8 1.39 1.67  0.41 0.94   
 Relative trust in EU versus national government -2 2 0.08 0.82  0.23 0.63   
 Education 1 5 3.15 0.9  2.88 0.92   
 Economic Class 1 5 2.79 0.9  2.26 1.03   
Slovenia      887   526 0.18 
 Satisfaction with democracy 1 4 2.27 1.11  2.43 0.76   
 Liberal definitions of democracy 0 2 0.99 0.55  1.03 0.63   
 Civic engagement 0 8 1.34 1.32  1.25 1.57   
 Relative trust in EU versus national government -2 2 -0.06 0.69  0.02 0.42   
 Education 1 5 2.97 0.85  3.2 0.8   
 Economic Class 1 5 2.75 0.87  2.75 0.88   
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Table A3: Correlation between prioritizing fighting rising prices and economic status 
 First Priority 
in 1995 
Second Priority 
in 1995 
First Priority 
in 2005 
Second Priority 
in 2005 
Economic 
Status 
-0.0260 -0.0104 0.0958 0.0400 
 
Table A4: Information about NGO Interviews 
 Number of NGOs Interviewed  Types of NGOs  Response Rate 
Bulgaria 8 Transparency (3) 
Youth engagement (1) 
NGO capacity-building (2) 
Media (1) 
Community development (1) 
80% 
Hungary 4 Transparency (1) 
Media (1) 
Rule of law (1) 
Human rights (1) 
40% 
Romania 4 Transparency (1) 
Rule of law (2) 
NGO capacity-building (1) 
40% 
Slovenia 3 Transparency (1) 
Civic engagement (1) 
NGO capacity-building (1) 
30% 
 
